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Cruelty in Criminal Law: Four Conceptions
Paulo Barrozo*
Abstract
This Article defines four distinct conceptions of cruelty found in
underdeveloped form in domestic and international criminal law
sources. The definition is analytical, focusing on the types of agency,
victimization, causality, and values in each conception of cruelty. But
no definition of cruelty will do justice to its object until complemented
by the kind of understanding practical reason provides of the implica-
tions of the phenomenon of cruelty.
No one should be neutral in relation to cruelty. Eminently, cruelty in
criminal law, a human-created phenomenon, vigorously calls for
responses in the form of preventive and corrective action on the part
of private and public actors. It is in this sense that cruelty is a problem
of practical reason, one of action preoccupied with its legal or moral
obligations, rational grounds, value commitments, and actual
consequences.
However, the connection between conceptions of cruelty and the
implications practical reason can draw from the correct application of
a conception of cruelty to phenomena in the world remains too
detached to be able to capture and explain people's actual experi-
ences both of seeing cruelty in the world and of confronting the ques-
tion of what to do about cruelty and how to address its cultural and
institutional aspects. Something is missing.
What is missing is the integration of conceptions of cruelty and the
practical reason implications of detecting cruelty in the world into
normative models which operate as meaning matrixes for cognition,
meaning, and action. This Article undertakes this explanatory task
through an exercise of reconstructing seminal philosophical ideas
about cruelty. The result is that the four conceptions of cruelty are
placed within three distinct normative models, which ultimately render
intelligible legal conceptions of cruelty and legal reactions to it.
I. Introduction: The Nature Of The Argument
Criminal law inicts and is complicit in, but also combats, cruelty. It
combats cruelty, for example, by more severely punishing hideous
crimes of violence such as torture and by prohibiting torturous and
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degrading punishments. Naturally, to combat cruelty criminal law can-
not avoid adopting — even if it has done so only in underdeveloped
and underarticulated ways — some conception of cruelty.1 This is also
a reminder that “the concepts we have settle for us the form of experi-
ence we have of the world,” as Peter Winch once wrote in good Wit-
tgensteinian style.2 In this Article I identify and discuss in analytical,
explanatory, and normative terms the conceptions of cruelty that
emerge in domestic and international criminal law sources.3
I argue that the study of those sources reveals four distinct concep-
tions of cruelty which, for convenience of reference, I have named
agent-objective, agent-subjective, victim-subjective, and victim-
objective/agent-independent respectively.4 The dierences between
these conceptions of cruelty rest on the types of agency, victimization,
causality, and values that they employ.5
1
Cruelty is, of course, an “essentially contested concept” as its semantic
frontiers are permanently in dispute in the various contexts in which a claim of cruelty
is presented. The locus classicus for the analyses of the nature of essentially contest-
able concepts is W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society 167, 167-78 (1956).
2
Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy 10-15
(Routledge, 2011) (1958). See also Kant's idea that the conceptions of understanding
although unempirical in origin, “are developed on occasions preseted by experience.”
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason 53 (J.M.D. Meiklejohn trans., Prometheus
1990).
3
Throughout I adopt the soft distinction between concept and conception,
where conceptions are instantiations of a concept.
4
I developed and previously used this conceptual framework in Punishing Cruelly:
Punishment, Cruelty and Mercy, 2 Crim. L. & Phil. 67 (2008) [hereinafter Punishing
Cruelly], and Reconstructing Constitutional Punishment, 6 Wash. U. Jurisprudence
Rev. 175 (2014) [hereinafter Reconstructing]. The current Article — the third install-
ment of the trilogy — emphasizes the practical reason implications of conceptions of
cruelty and places them within the broader meaning frameworks of what I call norma-
tive models.
5
These four conceptions of cruelty in criminal law mirror ubiquitous conceptions
of suering, victimization, agency, and causality. This point cannot be argued within
the connes of this Article. I only call attention here to how commitments to mercy,
human dignity, general solidarity, individual empowerment, positive and negative
structural justice, etc., discussed in this Article contribute to the normative foundation
of the extensive juridical corpus regulating central aspects of welfare, equality, liberty,
and solidarity. Of course, the cultural presence of a concern with cruelty extrapolates
the territory of law as well. My soap bar label reads, “cruelty-free, biodegradable,
natural, no articial colors.” It is clear that the intensity of the rejection of cruelty
grows in inverted proportion to its spread. Indeed, there is a point where the concern
is purely mimetic, lacking the sort of reective mediation which accompanies norma-
tive development of the kind studied in this essay. That my soap bar label has anything
to say about cruelty conrms the plausibility of theories of mimetic evolution (see
Richard Dawkins's The Selsh Gene (Oxford Univ. Press 2006), and Jack M. Balkin's
Cultural Software: A Theory of Ideology (Yale Univ. Press 1998), while the push of
reectivity discussed below proves clearly the existence of a normative territory
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Beyond conceptual analysis, it is important to recognize that the
phenomenon of cruelty in criminal law is a human-made problem that
calls for preventive and corrective responses in the form of comissive
and omissive action on the part of private (for instance, “do not add
torture to crimes of violence”) and public actors (for instance, “do not
punish torturously”). Cruelty is therefore a problem of practical reason,
one of action preoccupied with the agent's legal and moral obligations,
with the rational grounds of choice and action, with value commit-
ments, and with the concrete consequences of actions.
Built into the idea of practical reasoning is intentionality of action
oriented toward eecting the world in some way. “In the investigation
of rationality,” writes Searle, “we should concentrate our attention on
reasoning as an activity that actual selves engage in rather than focus-
ing on rationality as an abstract set of logical properties. If we do, then
it seems we nd in any activity of reasoning a collection of intentional
phenomena and a self that tries to organize them so as to produce
another intentional state as the end product.”6 Ordinarily, concepts
seek to capture and name phenomena and ideas. Some legal and
moral concepts such as cruelty or, say, human dignity do more than
that, though. They are intentionality tools. These normative concepts
are tools for identifying and solving problems of practical reason rather
than mere descriptors of juridical or moral facts. To call something
cruel is to single it out as a problem to be addressed — “[t]he
concepts of moral and political philosophy are the names of those
problems . . ..”7 This way of posing the question of cruelty follows the
tradition of legal and moral constructivism. In this tradition, to see
phenomena such as cruelty or ideas such as human dignity through
the lenses of legal and moral concepts is to be called upon to reason
one's way into choosing and acting in order to solve the normative
problems they raise.
Legal and moral concepts such as cruelty or dignity do not emerge
in a discursive vacuum, though.8 Were that the case, they would either
not imply a practical reason call to action or they would require that
guarded by reectivity and in which mimetic contamination is not the name of the
game, at least not any more or not yet.
6
John R. Searle, Rationality in Action 135 (MIT Press 2003).
7
Chritine M. Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical reason
and Moral Psychology (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
8
Robert Cover, Quentin Skinner, and Richard Tuckhave taught this best. See
Cover's essays collected in Skinner's Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays of
Robert Cover (Martha Minow et al. eds., Univ. of Michigan Press 2010); Quentin
Skinner, Language and Political Change, in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change
6 (Terence Ball et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989); Richard Tuck, Philosophy
and Government: 1572-1651 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1993). For the “micro” aspects
of argumentative embedment see Michael J. Shapiro, The Micropolitics of Justice:
Language, Sense and Space, 8 Law, Culture & Human. 466 (2012).
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complete reasons be provided (that is, we would have to articulate the
complete set of reasons why one ought to act one way or another)
before a call to action becomes intelligible.9 Concepts such as cruelty
or dignity entail a call to reason our way to intentionally resolving the
problems they raise precisely because they are embedded in broader
normative paradigms or models.
The role of normative models is therefore that of lling the discursive
space around concepts by providing a meaning matrix that illuminates
in various degrees the historical signicance, cultural meaning,
institutional embodiment, normative ambition, and rational status of
normative concepts.10 In the case of conceptions of cruelty, and again
for ease of reference, I name the broad normative models they inhabit
cruelty as agency, cruelty as sentience, and cruelty as predicament. I
argue that these normative models ultimately render intelligible norms
and attitudes about cruelty based on each of the four conceptions of
cruelty.
In other words, conceptions and practical reason orientations to
solving the problem of cruelty are suciently intelligible only when
considered within their embedding normative models. It is that embed-
ment that explains the historical signicance, cultural meaning,
institutional embodiment, normative ambition, and rational status of the
conceptions. Unsurprisingly, that is also why each of the three norma-
tive models informs a corresponding conception of mercy and of the
requirements of a just and decent criminal law system as part of a
solution to the problem of cruelty.11
I undertake these analytical and explanatory tasks in the form of a
reconstruction of seminal conceptions of cruelty in the history of legal,
political and moral thought — “[i]t is when dierent insights from dif-
9
On “complete reasons” see Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 23-25
(Oxford Univ. Press 1990).
10
In one of her earliest works, Christine Korsgaard provided an interpretation of
Kant that correctly recognized the centrality of human meaning-giving to the founda-
tions of his practical reason philosophy. She wrote: “Goodness is not a property
already belonging to certain kinds of things in the world, which is to be ascertained
and then sought out. A thing is good because a free rational being who brings value
into the world chooses it as good. Good and evil, right and wrong, are features of the
world that we bring into it through the manner of our choices and actions. When we
look at the world theoretically, we can nd no basis for objective judgments of moral
value. The moral truth is perspicuous to us only from the standpoint of practical
reason.” Christine M. Korsgaard, The Standpoint of Practical Reason 301 (Garland
1990).
11
See on the topic of mercy Linda Ross Meyer, The Justice of Mercy (2013);
Claudia Card, On Mercy, 81 Phil. Rev. 182 (Univ. of Michigan Press 1972); Ross
Harrison, The Equality of Mercy, in Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays 107 (Hyman
Gross & Ross Harrison eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1992); Martha Nussbaum, Equity and
Mercy, 22 Phil. & Pub. A. 83 (1993); Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev.
1421 (2004), and Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, Forgiveness, Mercy and Clemency
(Stanford Univ. Press 2006).
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ferent sources are connected with each other that philosophy truly
educates us.”12 In mobilizing seminal insights on the problem of cruelty
by Seneca, Thomas Aquinas, Michel de Montaigne, Immanuel Kant,
Karl Marx, and John Stuart Mill, I show the construction of denitional
boundaries as well as the types of arguments that place those
boundaries within encompassing normative vistas that include
proposed solutions to the problem of cruelty.13
Although I present each of the four conceptions of cruelty in the
chronological order of its appearance in the history of ideas, I ultimately
argue that they are all now subsumable under the third normative
12
Hilary Putnam, The Fact/Value Dichotomy and Its Critics, reprinted in
Philosophy in an Age of Science: Physics, Mathematics, and Skepticism 283, 298
(Mario De Caro & David MacArthur eds., Harvard Univ. Press, 2012). As Charles
Taylor once wrote, “To understand ourselves today, we are pushed into the past for
paradigm statements of our formative articulations. We are forced back to the last full
disclosure of what we have been about, or what our practice has been woven about.”
Charles Taylor, Philosophy and Its History, in Philosophy in History 17, 26 (Richard
Rorty et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1993). I presuppose throughout the centrality
of meaning in human experience. Max Weber more than any other has brought this
centrality to the attention of the modern social scientist. I think Diderot captured it well
when he wrote in the Encyclopédie that “If mankind, or the thinking and contemplative
beings which comprise it, were banished from the surface of the earth, the moving
and sublime spectacle of nature would be nothing more than a scene of desolation
and silence. The universe would be mute; stillness and night would take possession of
it. Everything would be transformed into a vast emptiness where unremarked
phenomena would occur, dimly and unheard.” Denis Diderot's Political Writings 25
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
13
The sources used here are Seneca's De Clementia, written by AD 55 or 56
and addressed to his pupil, the then young emperor Nero; Aquinas' Summa Theologiae,
published from 1265-1272, in particular Questions 2a2ae 157 and 159, dedicated to
De Clementia et Mansuetudine and De Crudelitate, respectively, as part of his writings
on the virtue of temperance; Montaigne's essay “On Cruelty,” appearing in Book II of
his Essais, which had various modied editions until his death in 1592; Kant's
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals of 1785; Marx's “On the Jewish Question”
of 1843, “For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing” of 1844, “Preface to ‘A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’ ’’ of 1859, and the rst volume of
Capital, written in 1866 and 1867 and published in 1867; and, nally, Mill's The
Subjection of Women, written in 1861 but not published until 1869. See Lucius
Seneca, Moral Essays (John W. Basore trans., Harvard Univ. Press 2003); Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Thomas Gilby trans., Blackfriars1972); Michel de
Montaigne, The Complete Essays (M.A. Screech trans., Penguin 1991); Kant, supra
note 13; Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Marx: Early Political Writings 28
(Joseph O'Malley & Richard A. Davis trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994); Karl Marx,
For a Ruthless Criticism of Everything Existing, in The Marx-Engels Reader 15 (Robert
C. Tucker ed., Norton1978) [hereinafter Ruthless Criticism], Karl Marx, Preface to ‘A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy’ used in conjunction with his The
German Ideology: Part I in The Marx-Engels Reader, supra note 13. The German
Ideology was written in 1845-1846 but only published in 1932, and Capital: A Critique
of Political Economy Vol. I (Ben Fowkes trans., Vintage1977) [hereinafter Capital]; and
John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other
Essays 469 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
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model, namely cruelty as predicament. This claim can only be
redeemed by the whole argument of the Article itself. For now, I only
mention what is implicated in the claim, namely, the role and operation
of reectivity in normative arguments and models and the companion
understanding of the connection between reason and history.
The general thesis here is that each conception of cruelty leads to
the others under the pressure of reectivity, or of what I call “the push
of reectivity,” to which I return in a moment. Again for convenience of
exposition, I present infra the push of reectivity in linear chronological
order, but it can certainly operate in circular fashion, getting us to the
four conceptions of cruelty no matter where one starts in the
conceptual circle. That is, whatever conception of cruelty and cor-
responding normative model one starts with, the push of reectivity
triggered by its limitations vis-à-vis the legal and moral problem at
hand will force the careful thinker onward to dimensions of the problem
of cruelty which have escaped the initial conception.14
In all this, there is no need to inate the notion of reectivity or to
appeal to arcane conceptions of it. By reectivity I mean quite simply
something inspired by the ancient sense of the word ennoia: intense,
careful, self-conscious, and self-critical thinking. In this sense, reectiv-
ity informs a type of reasoning mindful of, and yet not reducible to,
instrumental, context-bound, or self-interested reasoning. This ir-
reducibility comes from the fact that reectivity implicates the faculty
of judgment, practical rationality, attention to context accompanied by
the capacity to transcend it in principled ways, and constant critical
pressure. Obviously, these virtues of reectivity are conspicuously
absent or at best insuciently present in the rather at rationality of
predominantly empirical or instrumental types of reasoning.15
At any rate, this deated conception of reectivity requires ac-
14
On the nature of the argument developed here, see Thomas Kuhn, The
Structure of Scientic Revolutions (Univ. of Chicago Press 1996); Alasdair MacIntyre,
The Relationship of Philosophy to Its Past, in Philosophy in History: Essays in the
Historiography of Philosophy (Richard Rorty et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984);
and, naturally, George W. F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000).
15
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers 5-6 (Univ. of Illinois Press
2006) (speaks of “an excess of intellect that [a people or an individual] no longer
directs [. . .] only for personal, individual purposes but rather arrives at a pure intuition
with it.”). Although an extensive treatment of the question of reectivity cannot be ac-
commodated in this essay, I am convinced that some form of rational and intellectual
exuberance of this sort is inextricably involved in reectivity as a weighty causal fac-
tor in social processes. The pages below will show that the development of the ideas
about cruelty corroborates this thesis, for if we begin from an agent-based conception
of cruelty, at some point down the road of serious reection we will tend to arrive at a
victim-objective/agent-independent conception. In such cases reectivity operates as
a virus inoculated into normative models which from within — as Socrates tried to
teach Thrasymachus — pushes their development in discernible directions. See
Plato's Republic (Harvard Univ. Press 1999-2000) and the reading of the dialogue
Criminal Law Bulletin
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ceptance of only two, I hope uncontroversial, points about the form of
reectivity. First, that rationally defensible normative worldviews are
built upon, and are expressed as, clusters of converging and cohering
normative arguments. That is, they are built with normative models.
Second, that normative models carry logical and deontological entail-
ments as well as practical requirements, cognitive access to which is
gained by thinking thoroughly, clearly, critically, and constructively
about them — that is, by reectivity.
Now, reectivity matters both biographically and sociologically. An
important consequence of reectivity for individuals is that once they
embark on sustained reection about something, they stop before the
end of the reection only at the price of personal intellectual sacrice.
The same can be said to be true of societies. Once there is a suf-
cient critical mass of members of society devoted to being reective
about aspects of social life and its arrangements or when culture in
that society evolves the attributes of irony16 and self-criticism, social
change consistent with reective conclusions is only prevented at the
cost of society's overall legitimacy and appeal. Above I referred to the
“push of reectivity” as the way reectivity operates to bring changes
within ideational or cultural domains and beyond into social practices
and institutions. Implicit in the causal strength of the push of reectiv-
ity is a conception of the connection between the history of human
civilization and reason whereby reason is, in the words of Axel Hon-
neth, history's “guiding thread.”17
In the end, the changes in normative models studied in this Article
favor interpretations of modernity that give prominence to the content-
creation capabilities of reective forces over the operation of
normatively-blind strategizing or managerial or merely participatory
social and even democratic mechanisms. The understanding of reec-
tive evolution in criminal law ultimately provides the most elegant,
historically informative, and critically constructive standpoint from
which to understand the ways, good and bad, of criminal justice. If I
am right, the operation of reectivity in the evolution of notions of
cruelty and their respective normative models may serve as a model
of legal reasoning to be emulated beyond criminal law.
. . .
Analysis and explanation infra of notions of cruelty, of the implica-
between Socrates and Thrasymachus in Hanna Pitkin, Wittgenstein and Justice: On
the Signicance of Ludwig Wittgenstein for Social and Political Thought (Univ. of
California Press 1972). For a defense of “Socratic citizenship” as a form of reective
agency, see Dana R. Villa's Socratic Citizenship (Princeton Univ. Press 2001).
16
Irony in the sense used by Richard Rorty in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
17
AAxel Honneth, Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory 20
(Columbia Univ. Press 2009).
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tions practical reason can draw from them, and of their embedment in
normative models will necessarily push contemporary criminal law
back into its larger background in legal, moral and political theory. But,
before criminal law sources dissolve into fuller normativity, and as an
exercise in temporary denitions, consider the following examples of
how the four conception of cruelty have appeared in criminal law
cases. The reason why I name them agent-objective, agent-subjective,
victim-subjective, and victim-objective/agent-independent, respec-
tively, will not become fully clear until later in the Article. That much
said, I trust the reader will already see here the logic behind my
nomenclature.
1. Agent-objective
“It is . . . within the historic process of constitutional adjudication to
challenge the imposition of the death penalty in some barbaric manner
or as a penalty wholly disproportionate to a particular criminal act.
And in making such a judgment . . . a court may consider contempo-
rary standards to the extent they are relevant.”18
“Feelings of ‘fear, anguish and inferiority’ are the common lot of
mankind constantly experienced by everyone in the course of ordinary
everyday life: that is ‘la condition humaine’. Yet no one would consider
himself, or regard others, as humiliated and debased because of
experiencing such feelings, even though some experience them very
easily and others only for greater cause. Thus it is not the subjective
feelings aroused in the individual that humiliate or debase but the
objective character of the act or treatment that gives rise to those
feelings — if it does — and even if it does not, — for it is possible for
fanatics at one end of the scale, and saints, martyrs and heroes at the
other to undergo the most degrading treatment and feel neither humili-
ated nor debased, but even uplifted. Yet the treatment itself remains
none the less degrading.”19
2. Agent-subjective
“The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt
consummation of the sentence cannot . . . add an element of cruelty
to a subsequent execution. There is no purpose to inict unnecessary
pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution.”20
18
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 420, 92 S. Ct. 2726, 33 L. Ed. 2d 346
(1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
19
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 E.H.R.R 25 (Jan. 18, 1978) (Fitzmaurice, J.), avail-
able at http://www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1978/1.html.
20
State of La. ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464, 67 S. Ct. 374, 91
L. Ed. 422 (1947).
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“This Court's cases ‘mandate inquiry into a prison ocial's state of
mind,’ [. . .] and it is no accident that the Court has repeatedly said
that the Eighth Amendment has a ‘subjective component.’ ’’21
“The ve [sensory deprivation] techniques were applied in combina-
tion with premeditation . . .”22
3. Victim-subjective
“Pain, certainly, may be a factor in the judgment. The iniction of an
extremely severe punishment will often entail physical suering. Yet
the Framers also knew that there could be exercises of cruelty by
laws other than those which inicted bodily pain or mutilation. Even
though there may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive
torture, severe mental pain may be inherent in the iniction of a
particular punishment.”23
“Death is [. . .] an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its pain,
in its nality, and in its enormity.”24
“[I]ll-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall
within the scope of Article 3 [of the European Convention on Human
Rights]. The assessment of this minimum is, in the nature of things,
relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the
duration of the treatment, its physical or mental eects and, in some
cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim, etc.”25
4. Victim-objective & agent-independent
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish,
the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within
the limits of civilized standards.”26
“The barbaric punishments condemned by history . . . are, of
course, attended with acute pain and suering. When we consider
why they have been condemned, however, we realize that the pain
involved is not the only reason. The true signicance of these punish-
ments is that they treat members of the human race as nonhumans,
as objects to be toyed with and discarded. They are thus inconsistent
with the fundamental premise of the [Cruel and Unusual Punishment]
21
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 826, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed. 2d 811
(1994).
22
Ireland, 2 E.H.R.R 25.
23
Furman, 408 U.S. at 271 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
24
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 229, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
25
Ireland, 2 E.H.R.R 25.
26
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1958).
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Clause that even the vilest criminal remains a human being possessed
of common human dignity.”27
“The words ‘cruel and unusual’ certainly include penalties that are
barbaric. But the words . . . suggest that it is ‘cruel and unusual’ to
apply the death penalty — or any other penalty — selectively to
minorities whose numbers are few, who are outcasts of society, and
who are unpopular, but whom society is willing to see suer though it
would not countenance general application of the same penalty across
the board.”28
“[T]he burden of capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant,
and the underprivileged members of society. [. . .] Their impotence
leaves them victims of a sanction that the wealthier, better-
represented, just-as-guilty person can escape. So long as the capital
sanction is used only against the forlorn, easily forgotten members of
society, legislators are content to maintain the status quo, because
change would draw attention to the problem and concern might
develop. Ignorance is perpetuated and apathy soon becomes its mate,
and we have today's situation.”29
“The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation
. . . is inherently intimidating . . . This atmosphere carries its own
badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but
it is equally destructive of human dignity.”30
“[T]he Court is of the opinion that the prison conditions complained
of diminished the applicant's human dignity and aroused in him feel-
ings of anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him
and possibly breaking his physical or moral resistance.”31
“The Court would further emphasize that the essence of such viola-
tion does not so much lie in the fact of the ‘disappearance’ of the fam-
ily member but rather concerns the authorities' reactions and attitudes
to the situation when it is brought to their attention.”32
These conceptions of cruelty, taken from American and European
criminal law, are representative of the notions of cruelty that appear in
the criminal law sources of many other criminal jurisdictions over time
and space.33 They are distinguishable along three axes; the resulting
three-dimensional matrix captures all four conceptions of cruelty. On
27
Furman, 408 U.S. at 272-73 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
28
Furman, 408 U.S. at 244-45.
29
Furman, 408 U.S. at 365-66.
30
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 10
A.L.R.3d 974 (1966).
31
Peers v. Greece, 33 E.H.R.R. 51 (Apr.19, 2001).
32
Cakici v. Turkey, 31 E.H.R.R. 5 (July 7, 1999).
33
In some cases the prohibition appears under more inclusive language, thus set-
ting higher the bar of protection. See, for example, the German Basic Law of 1949,
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the rst axis, the denitional element of cruelty runs from focus on
agency to focus on victimization in the perpetrator-victim relationship.
This dimension of distinctions is obvious enough.
The second axis of distinction tracks emphasis on objective or
subjective denitional elements. Objective conceptions emphasize the
objective impact of cruelty on its victims or the behavior of agents of
cruelty in relation to objective norms of conduct. Subjective concep-
tions require on the part of victims a minimum level of actual feeling or
awareness, whereas on the part of agents of cruelty they require
some degree of mens rea or hedonistic gratication vis-à-vis the
subjective suering or objective condition of victims.
Adding a third dimension to the model, consider further the aspects
of time and causation that are relevant under each conception of
cruelty. While the rst three conceptions of cruelty direct the focus to
units of action and harm concentrated in time, the fourth conception
invites attention to protracted causality and long-term and cumulative
eects. This last, more continuous, role of temporal considerations in
law is clearly manifest, for example, in the search for solutions to
problems of social vulnerability and unequal protection by the law.
Denitional purity aside, in contemporary criminal law the four
conceptions of cruelty have proved not to be mutually exclusive.
Rather, they relate to one another through a semantic and normative
process of foregrounding and backgrounding the various denitional
elements. Again, the denitional regimes that emerge from this process
will only be fully intelligible in light of the normative models that
integrate notions of cruelty and the implications practical reason can
draw from them.
II. Cruelty As Agency: Agent-Objective Conception & Agent-
Subjective Conception
A. Agent-Objective Conception
In criminal law, agent-objective cruelty is exemplied by punitive
agency that goes above in degree and beyond in type the punishment
allowed by applicable norms. We owe to Seneca, the author of what
is, as far as I know, the earliest surviving sustained discussion of
cruelty, the seminal explanation of the agent-objective concept of
cruelty.34 Because his conception presupposes a suering victim,
cruelty is dened by the anomic behavior of the agent who causes
Article 104 [Legal guarantees in the event of detention], “[. . .] Detainees may not be
subjected to mental or physical ill-treatment” (emphasis added). The Brazilian
Constitution of 1988, after proclaiming that no punishment shall be “cruel” (Article 5,
XLVII, e) further asserts that respect of their physical and moral integrity is guaranteed
to all prisoners (Article 5, XLIX).
34
Seneca, De Clementia, supra note 13.
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that suering. However, it is Seneca's emphasis on agency and objec-
tive norms of behavior that renders his conception agent-objective.35
Consistent with his Stoic philosophy, Seneca's conception of cruelty
places it in the context of a broader normative model anchored in
natural law and virtue ethics theories. Specically, cruelty is a point on
a continuum of vices and virtues, with the vices on each end: pity —
mercy — strictness — cruelty. On this continuum, pity is a vicious
degeneration of the virtue of mercy in punishment, and cruelty is a vi-
cious degeneration of the virtue of strictness. While excessive mercy
turns into pity, excessive strictness descends into cruelty. Cruelty
thus obtains when excessive suering is caused by agents whose
behavior deviates from statutory, customary, religious or moral norms
of strictness. It is important to note that in Seneca's scheme, pity is
opposed to strictness and cruelty to mercy. An excessively soft puni-
tive system36 can be rehabilitated by increased strictness, and a cruel
one by increased mercy.
Seneca thus writes:
“But,” you say, “there are some who do not exact punishment and
yet are cruel, such as those who kill the strangers they meet, not for
the sake of gain, but for the sake of killing, and, not content with kill-
ing, they torture. [. . .]” This indeed is cruelty; but because it does not
result from vengeance — for no injury was suered — and no sin stirs
its wrath — for no crime preceded it — it falls outside of our defnition;
for by the defnition the mental excess was limited to the exaction of
punishment. That which nds pleasure in torture we may say is not
cruelty, but savagery—we may even call it madness; for there are
various kinds of madness, and none is more unmistakable than that
which reaches the point of murdering and mutilating men. Those, then,
that I shall call cruel are those who have a reason for punishment, but
do not have moderation in it, like Phalaris, who, they say, tortured
men, even though they were not innocent, in a manner that was inhu-
man and incredible. Avoiding sophistry we may dene cruelty to be
the inclination of the mind toward the side of harshness. This quality
mercy repels and bids it stand ajar from her; with strictness she is in
harmony.37
This passage orients the scheme of vices and virtues in the context
of punishment. It oers a conception of cruelty as excess in punish-
ment, where excess is measured by the yardstick of natural criminal
35
The reconstruction of Seneca's ideas follows, with some modications, my
reading of him in Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly, supra note 4.
36
On ancient punishment, see David Luban, Some Greek Trials: Order and Justice
in Homer, Hesiod, Aeschylus, and Plato, 54 Tenn. L. Rev. 279 (1987) and Adriaan
Lanni, Verdict Most Just: The Modes of Classical Athenian Justice, 16 Yale J.L. &
Human. 277 (2004).
37
Seneca, Moral Essays, supra note 13, at 435-37.
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law. In his eort to persuade his pupil Nero to abandon the ways of
cruelty, Seneca reminded him that the only virtue that could truly rival
great power was that of self-control. This self-control of sovereign
punitive power takes the form of mercy. Commanded by natural
criminal law, punitive mercy is also favored for consequentialist
reasons, “Mercy [. . .] makes rulers not only more honored, but safer,
and is at the same time the glory of sovereign power and its surest
protection.”38 Mercy is, furthermore, an unconditional virtue. No matter
how atrocious the deed to be punished, its agent is to be treated
mercifully by the punitive powers. Nothing can excuse the sovereign
from this duty. The unconditionality of mercy helps explain why the
character and behavior of the victim cannot excuse any withholding of
mercy on the agent-objective conception of cruelty.
However, according to Seneca, mercy should not be unlimited, lest
it degenerate into pity. Augustine, inuenced by Seneca, stresses the
importance of submitting “compassion” to reason lest it decay from
virtue to vice. He writes: “And what is compassion but a kind of fellow
feeling in our hearts for the misery of another which compels us to
help him if we can? This impulse is the servant of right reason when
compassion is displayed in such a way as to preserve righteousness
[. . .].”39
Punishment, which has an important social function to meet, ac-
cording to Seneca, cannot succeed if it fails to express the distinction
between vice and virtue. Mercy, therefore, must not operate to blur the
distinction between good and bad.40 Its role is that of tempering punish-
ment, the type and severity of which must be sucient to demarcate
38
Seneca, Moral Essays, supra note 13, at 391.
39
Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans 365 (Cambridge Univ. Press
2006). For a learned study of the Stoic (and Platonic) inuences on Augustine's moral
philosophy, see Sarah Catherine Byers, Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation
in Augustine (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013). On the theological conundra involved in
the idea of divine mercy, see Anselm of Canterbury, The Major Works (Gill Evans &
Brian Davies eds., 2008). Martha Nussbaum thus denes compassion: “By ‘compas-
sion’ I mean a painful emotion directed at the serious suering of another creature or
creatures . . . According to my account . . .; compassion has three thoughts as
necessary parts . . . First, there is a thought of seriousness; in experiencing compas-
sion, the person who feels the emotion thinks that someone else is suering in some
way that is important and nontrivial . . . Second is the thought of nonfault: we typi-
cally don't feel compassion if we think the person's predicament chosen or self-
inicted . . . Finally” adds Nussbaum, “it is what I call the eudaimonistic thought. This
is the judgment or thought that places the suering person or persons among the
important parts of the life of the person who feels the emotion.” Martha Nussbaum,
Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice 142-44 (Cambridge: The Belknap
Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2013). Augustine's denition includes a practical reason
call to action which Nussbaum's account of the structure of compassion leaves out
for sound analytical reasons. She does not fail however to draw profound political
implications from the emotion of compassion.
40
See Seneca, Moral Essays, supra note 13, at 363-95.
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virtue from vice without indulging in the imposition of the maximum
punishment power is capable of. In short, the gap between sucient
and possible punishment is not to be crossed, for only cruelty can
bridge it.
Seneca placed cruelty in a normative model made possible by an
absolute and immutable natural law system. This system was able to
guide action toward virtue — thus collapsing the distance between
concept and action — because, as Seneca believed, it oered objec-
tive norms to assess behavior independently of mentalist
considerations. In contemporary criminal law, the normative benchmark
of cruelty is no longer found in natural law, but rather in punitive tradi-
tions, communal standards, fables of original legislative meaning, or in
specic laws or individual sentences.41 But even on the narrow grounds
of the objective social or legal norms available to us, it would be very
hard to argue that existing criminal justice systems are not cruel.42
Even in what is usually seen as mainstream and legitimate punishment,
the gap between minimally necessary punishment and the maximum
punishment power has the resources to impose is constantly bridged.
In crossing this this gap, the state necessarily employs a form of
violence that meets the denitional requirements of the agent-objective
conception of cruelty.
Seneca's conception of cruelty was made intelligible in its complex
of assumptions and implications as part of a normative model anchored
in natural law and informed by a Stoic outlook. Though his normative
model has since lost its appeal and authority, the resulting condemna-
tion of cruelty has an enduring and pervasive inuence in criminal law,
as the sources quoted in the introduction illustrate. Furthermore,
Seneca will always be right in his observation that “cruelty's greatest
curse — [is] that one must persist in it, and no return to better things
is open; for crime must be safeguarded by crime. But what creature is
more unhappy than the man who now cannot help being wicked?”43
Culturally speaking, criminal law theory can benet from the learned,
agonistic reections on cruelty found in the pages of De Clementia,
which explain cruelty in one of its fundamental, and thus far enduring,
forms.
B. Agent-Subjective Conception
Thomas Aquinas orchestrated a subjectivist turn in the conception
of cruelty inherited from Seneca, while at the same time sharing with
Seneca the main contours of a normative model centered on natural
law as a framework for a (now Aristotelian) ethics of virtue. In Aquinas'
41
For a detailed discussion of the objective norms that now operate as functional
equivalents of natural law, see Barrozo, Reconstructing, supra note 4.
42
Barrozo, Punishing Cruelly, supra note 4.
43
Seneca, Moral Essays, supra note 13, at 397.
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formulation, and consistent with Seneca's denition, the concept of
cruelty still presupposes a suering victim, takes the agent end of the
perpetrator-victim axis, and requires that the agent's suering-causing
commission or omission be in violation of an objectively ascertainable
normative standard of behavior. However, Aquinas adds a subjective
element: cruelty obtains only when the agent's deviant behavior is ac-
companied by the fault of character consisting in deriving personal
delight from causing and witnessing suering.
For Aquinas, cruelty is at one end of the continuum softness —
mercy — clemency — cruelty. The righteous middle of the continuum
is to be found in the virtues of mercy and clemency. On this continuum,
softness is the vice of laxity in punishment, and cruelty the vice, on
the part of the agent of excessive punishment, of delight in the tor-
ments he inicts on his victims. Mercy in this scheme is a rational
decision to relieve suering caused by punishment, and clemency is
the disposition of temper prompting to mercy. In the context of punish-
ment, cruelty obtains when suering is caused by a punitive agency
that delights in the hardships that punishment brings upon those
subject to it. It is worth noticing that, whereas for Aquinas the subjec-
tive element of cruelty was hedonistic in nature, in contemporary
criminal law this element is usually judged by traditional mens rea
standards.
Aquinas's subjectivist turn is best understood in the context of his
natural law theory. More complex and developed than Seneca's,
Aquinas's natural law theory speaks of a divinely ordered universe,
the balance and symmetry of which is maintained rst and foremost in
the inner spaces of reason and passions.44 Both Seneca and Aquinas
conceive of a cosmic order permanently vulnerable to violation, in ac-
tion or intention, by free-willing agents. On this worldview, punishment
is a means to restore, via retribution and the expressive function of
punishment, a violated cosmic order, bringing it back to its ex ante
perfection. To punish is to nullify45 the aggression free-willing agents
have inicted on the natural order of the universe. Hence, and
importantly, both Seneca and Aquinas insist that punishment does not
violate, objectively or subjectively, the order it seeks to repair.
The idea of a cosmic order in Thomist jurisprudence is created and
guaranteed by an interlocking normative system. His philosophy of law
distinguishes four types of law: eternal, natural, human, and divine.
These four dierent kinds of law are distinguished by their lawgivers,
their jurisdiction or scope, and the strength of their binding authority.
44
The modern natural law jurisprudence of Grotius and Hobbes intensies the
mentalist element of Aquinas' natural law, rather than completely breaking with it. See
Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace ch. 1 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund
2005) and Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1992).
45
The same assertion is made by Kant's and Hegel's legal rationalism.
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Aquinas denes eternal law as the government, by God's reason, of
everything existing in the universe.46 In the jurisdiction of eternal law,
Aquinas places the whole realm of physis, which comprises, for
instance, the laws of nature in biology, chemistry, and physics; that is,
laws which govern “the whole community of the universe . . . by
Divine Reason.”47 Eternal law has, moreover, absolute binding power.
The absoluteness of its power is faultlessly evinced in blind
observance of its decrees by nature; a nature which, in its passivity
and unconsciousness, displays the prescriptions of God's reason.
Eternal law is, therefore, the normative dimension of the great order of
things.
Natural law applies solely to humankind. It is, in a sense, a section
of eternal law, with specialized jurisdiction over beings that partake, to
a limited but fundamental extent, in God's rational attributes: “the
rational creature is subject to divine providence in the most excellent
way [. . .]. [w]herefore it has a share of the eternal reason.”48
Analogous to and derived from God's, human reasoning is able, as-
serts Aquinas, to guide choices and deeds toward the common good,
“and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is
called the natural law.”49 It is, thus, the “imprint” on people of a “divine
light” that entrusts them, as the rational segment of God's creation,
with co-responsibility for the government of the cosmos according to
the good. In their possession and use of this natural reason, individu-
als join God as active participants in the government of the universe,
specically in the government of society.
In the natural association of individuals into societies, humanity
indeed lives as a ruled species; ruled, however, by itself, for humanity
is co-author, with God who endowed it with a share of his reason, of
the law under which it lives. It is important to note that although natural
law binds in conscience, human conscience is not perfect. Thus,
though universally cogent, the natural law makes room for a certain
degree of anomie. Aquinas explains the failure to comply perfectly
with the precepts of natural law as the result of the operation of two
factors. The rst is the generality and universality of the precepts of
natural law, which require determination and particularization,
respectively. Between the imprecise/general and the precise/particular
lies the operation of the fallible human mind. The second reason for
incomplete compliance with natural law is the disturbing inuence of
the passions, this ever-present reminder of humankind's second,
animal, nature.
46
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 91, Art. 1.
47
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 91, Art. 1.
48
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 91, Art. 1.
49
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 91, Art. 1.
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For Aquinas, human law (positive law)50 is the human way of ad-
dressing, through the exercise of what amounts to only a hint of God's
perfect reason, the problems of generalization, universalization, and
anomie. In this jurisprudential framework, human law must be derived
from natural law as a logical “conclusion from premises” or as a
“determination of certain generalities.”51 The problem of anomie is
explained as the product of an imperfectly honed virtue which fails to
shield itself from the inuence of untamed passions. In order to perfect
virtues, Aquinas recommends a “training, which compels through fear
of punishment,” that is, “the discipline of laws.”52 Human law is thus a
human-made artifact in the service of natural law enforcement.
As a product of human reason for the purposes established by
natural law, human law is, of course, bound to suer from imperfec-
tions of conception and application. Because human law, as a product
of practical reason, is by denition preoccupied with practical aairs, it
will certainly fail to achieve the infallibility of science. Mistakes, Aquinas
contends, are thus to be expected in matters of practical reason.
Consequently, human law is not expected to achieve immaculate
perfection, but only constant improvement — a form of perfectibility
that “is possible in its own particular genus.”53
Moreover, Aquinas submits, human law cannot and should not cover
the entire immense and sorrowful catalogue of human vices, but only
those carrying grave social consequences.54 The vices to be repressed
by human law are those aecting the common good, that is, those
with a public implication. All vices with private consequences only (or
primarily) are to be left alone by positive law. These fall into the proper
domain of divine law, the fourth kind of law in Aquinas's jurisprudence.
Aquinas's anthropology maintains that humankind is naturally com-
mitted to the common good, “ordained” as it is to the end of eternal
happiness, which can only be achieved by following God's direct guid-
ance through the medium of law. In addition to providing rm guidance
to souls struggling to earn salvation in the form of a heavenly afterlife,
divine law has yet a second role in Thomistic jurisprudence. It assists
in the correction of problems created by the fallibility and natural
idiosyncrasies of human judgment as it tries to determine the content
of natural law and to cope with the duty to posit a human law in ac-
cordance with natural law. Because divine laws were revealed by God
through prophets and enshrined in sacred scripture, they cannot pos-
sibly err. Therefore, divine law, which is universal in reach, can oer
50
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 91, Art. 3.
51
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 95, Art. 2.
52
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 95, Art. 1.
53
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 91, Art. 3.
54
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 96, Art. 2.
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untainted insight into the nature of goodness and unimpeachable
certainty about which practices and intentions have redeeming value.
There is yet another problem to be addressed by divine law. Let us
call this the problem of the double requirement of virtue:55 “man is not
competent to judge of interior movements, that are hidden, but only of
exterior acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is
necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts.”56
Divine law, whose perfection reects the perfection of its lawgiver, is
able to provide a trusted path to redemption and ultimate salvation via
virtuous behavior.
Finally, as noted above, it would be neither possible nor desirable
for human laws to punish all evils. Such a comprehensive punitive
system would, unavoidably, have to work against the common good in
many circumstances.57 However, in order that no vice remain
unpunished, divine law makes whole the cosmic order by decreeing
every sin forbidden.58 There is no doubt that sinful anomie also
threatens divine law, but the punishment it carries never fails; as,
Aquinas reassures us, God's judgment never fails.
The integrative and systemic nature of the four types of law in
Aquinas's jurisprudence sets the stage for his subjectivist turn on the
concept of cruelty. Aquinas' classical natural law represents a
sustained legal-philosophical eort to conceive of a system that, in its
kaleidoscopic normativity, could claim to be the only correct and
complete ordering of things and beings by practical reason and bind-
ing in human conscience. Nothing less than such a superimposing and
gapless legal apparatus is required by the predicament of beings
whose understanding of God is only deep enough to develop a
conscious awareness of their own imperfections. What place do the
virtues opposed to cruelty occupy in such a system? How does that
place help explain the subjectivist turn of the rst normative models in
the rejection of cruelty?
In a rst approximation, Aquinas raises the problem of cruelty as a
deviation from the natural ordering of human aairs. He does this in
two Questions (dedicated to the virtue of temperance) in the Summa
55
It is interesting to note the similarity here to Kant's practical philosophy in
which morality, binding in conscience as it is supposed to be, receives the comple-
ment of law, which binds deeds only. See his three “Introductions,” the general one to
the work and the two specic ones to the part on law and the part on virtues,
respectively, in his The Metaphysics of Morals in Immanuel Kant Practical Philosophy.
Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). About the
dependence of morals on laws see Tony Honoré (citation).
56
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 91, Art. 4.
57
Here the similarity is, interestingly enough, to John Stuart Mill's liberalism. See,
on this point, his On Liberty, in John Stuart Mill: On Liberty and Other Essays 5 (John
Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
58
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 91, Art. 3.
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Theologiae — Question 157, entitled De Clementia et Mansuetudine,
and Question 159, entitled De Crudelitate — in which he directly inter-
rogates Seneca's ideas on cruelty (treating them sometimes almost as
a medium for Aristotle). A fundamental dierence that emerges
concerns the requirements of virtue. Whereas, as discussed above,
Seneca sets requirements of compliance both in mind and in outcome-
oriented action for a deed to be considered virtuous, Aquinas relaxes,
for specic virtues including temperance, the outcome requirement. As
an anti-consequentialist, he dispenses with the results of courses of
action when assessing their moral value and the virtue of their agents.
Hence, Aquinas's jurisprudence does not require that deeds intended
to relieve suering achieve palpable success. Its only requirements
are a righteous intention and sincere attempt.
Another distinction between Seneca and Aquinas is related to the
rst and is equally important. It bears on the problem of the motivation
to act virtuously. In the architecture of Aquinas's conception of cruelty,
although the virtues of mercy, piety, and clemency59 express an inclina-
tion toward the relief of suering, they originate from dierent motives.
While piety is motivated by reverence for God, and mercy by compas-
sion (that is, by the capacity to empathize with the suering of others),
clemency is motivated by judgment, where judgment is a sense of
proportion and moderation of the mind operating under the tutelage of
natural reason. It is through a judgment of proportion and moderation
that clement relief of suering is provided. Since proportion is a
measure taken in light of a general standard (natural law in this case),
relief of suering is by denition motivated by a consideration alien to
the passive experience of the agony of pain. Therefore, relief of tor-
ment is required by clemency, independent of the intention — even if
righteous, of the agent who inicts it. Herein lies the objectivist ele-
ment in the conception of Aquinas, who, like Seneca, sees the world
through the lens of an objective normative order.
Aquinas begins the Question on De Crudelitate with two guiding
queries. The rst is “whether [cruelty] is the opposite of clemency”60
and the second is “how [cruelty] compares with ferocity and
savagery.”61 His answers to these questions further reveal the subjec-
tive element in his concept of cruelty. As I show, Aquinas opposes
cruelty to both clemency and mercy.
Aquinas begins with clemency. Since cruelty is a problem of punitive
excess, as it was for Seneca, it would seem that cruelty is the
counterpart not of clemency but of mercy. However, Aquinas argues
59
There would be a point to be made on the Latin words translated into “mercy,”
“pardon,” and “clemency” in Aquinas and Seneca. I will excuse myself from making it
here.
60
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 159, Art. 1.
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Cruelty in Criminal Law: Four Conceptions
1043© 2015 Thomson Reuters E Criminal Law Bulletin E Vol. 51 No. 5
that clemency, as part of the virtue of temperance and not that of
justice, has to do not with equity, as mercy does, but with a mild
disposition of the spirit — a state of mind. However, this conclusion is
only one part of the general structure of Aquinas's argument. His
objective is to show that cruelty is not only an injustice, but also a vice
contrary to temperance, contrary to a balanced disposition of
temperament. The reason why Aquinas places cruelty under temper-
ance rather than justice is the foregrounding of the agent's mental
disposition in the denition of cruelty. Whereas for Seneca conict
with public good is a sucient condition for a nding of vice, for
Aquinas a special state of mind must obtain. It is in the intersection of
what phenomenologically occurs with that which takes place invisibly
in the inner citadel of the conscience that the cruelty of a deed is
determined. It is precisely in this subjective requirement62 that the
agent-subjective conception of cruelty nds both its semantic and its
normative cores.
Aquinas illustrates the mentalist element he brings to cruelty with an
etymological argument. Here, again, the natural lawyer's appreciation
of proportion is in operation. However, instead of using geometrical
analogies to describe the social order, Aquinas appeals to a sensory
analogy — tasting. The analogy with tasting is deployed as a way to
overcome the diculty that arises from making cruelty the direct op-
posite of both clemency and mercy, as Seneca does. The point of the
analogy depends on the etymological derivation of the word cruelty
from ”cruditas,” that is, rawness. In this analogy, clemency “denotes a
certain smoothness or sweetness of soul,” which inspires the moderat-
ing of the punitive mind, whereas cruelty reects a sourness and bit-
terness of taste similar to that of unprepared food,63 a bitterness that
upsets the balance of reason and passions, allowing savage passions
to prevail.
However, Aquinas argues that both clemency and mercy oppose
cruelty. His argument is familiar territory to jurists: he distinguishes
cases and divides competencies. The structure of the argument here
rests upon several categories: just or unjust punishment, internally
excessive or externally excessive punishment, mercy, clemency, and
cruelty. Just punishment is that which is legal and rational. To mitigate
this type of punishment prospectively, in accordance with sound
reason, is equity proper, and to do so in a particular case is to act
mercifully. As unjust punishment fails the test of rationality and legality,
among its defects are the problems of internal and external excess in
punishing.
Moreover, the rectication of unjust punishment is a matter of equity,
hence of mercy. Cruelty in this conceptual scheme refers to the state
62
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 157, Art. 3.
63
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 159, Art. 1.
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of mind that, contrary to the prescriptions of mercy, delights in “excess
in punishing” and, contrary to clemency's commands to the conscience,
yields to a “hardness of heart, which makes one ready to increase
punishment.”64 Cruelty is, then, the intemperate mental disposition that
seeks injustice in punishment. As with Seneca's conception of cruelty,
Aquinas's clearly restricts it to the domain of punishment — a situa-
tion that would start to change only in the eighteenth century.65
On the second question, as to whether cruelty and savagery dier,
Aquinas gives a provisional no — hence, cruelty is the same as
savagery. This provisional answer is in line with most ancient virtue
philosophies, including Seneca's: for each virtue there is only one
contrasting vice. Indeed, if cruelty and savagery are opposed to clem-
ency, as Aquinas arms they are, they will necessarily appear the
same.66 However, Aquinas is a philosopher concerned with human
fault and redemption. Animal inclinations such as savagery are neither
vices nor virtues. They constitute an indelible stain on God's rational
creation, reminding humanity of its decayed condition. No matter how
honorable the human condition is in comparison with that of other
creatures, humanity's membership in the animal kingdom condemns it
to experience, in the fragile and transitory existences of individuals,
animal drives as well as God's enlightenment. This predicament
renders each person susceptible to salvation solely in relation to that
which is godlike in him — the rest is his fate. Fate rules, though, only
until God intervenes. To the inhuman character of savagery, only
another equally inhuman virtue can be opposed, a virtue that is a gift
of God: piety. Hence, savagery and piety are, respectively, the at-
tributes of two categories of non-human beings: beasts and saints.67
To summarize, Aquinas agrees with Seneca that punishment is the
proper domain of application of the concept of cruelty and that natural
64
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 159, Art. 1.
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67
“Clemency is a human virtue; wherefore directly opposed to it is cruelty which
is a form of human wickedness. But savagery or brutality is comprised under bestisal-
ity, wherefore it is directly opposed not to clemency, but to a more excellent virtue,
which the Philosopher [Aristotle in The Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 5] calls heroic or
god-like, which according to us, would seem to pertain to the gifts of the Holy Ghost.
Consequently we may say that savagery is directly opposed to the gift of piety.”
Aquinas, supra note 13, at Q. 159, Art. 2. Also, “Properly speaking, brutality or
savagery applies to those who in inicting punishment have not in view a default of
the person punished, but merely the pleasure they derive from a man's torture.
Consequently it is evident that it is comprised under bestiality: but suchlike pleasure is
not human but bestial. [. . .] On the other hand, cruelty not only regards the default of
the person punished, but exceeds in the mode of punishing: wherefore cruelty diers
from savagery or brutality, as human wickedness diers from bestiality.” Aquinas,
supra note 13, at Q. 159, Art. 2.
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law guides practical reason in matters of vice and virtue. On the axis
softness — mercy — clemency — cruelty, the virtuous middle is found
in mercy and clemency. The vice of cruelty obtains when the agent of
excessive punishment derives pleasure from the torments he inicts
on his victims. Mercy is a rational decision to relieve suering caused
by punishment, and clemency the disposition of temper leading to
mercy. Finally, because natural law binds in conscience, an adequate
concept of cruelty has to incorporate a subjective element.
Aquinas's agent-subjectivism narrows the agent-based conception
of cruelty. Where Seneca relied upon behavior in violation of an objec-
tive norm for a nding of cruelty, Aquinas saw the compliance require-
ments of natural law as internal. According to agent-subjectivism, un-
less and until the conscience missteps, no cruelty can be found, even
if otherwise cruel outcomes are present. Although Aquinas's mental-
ism emerged in the context of specic ancient and medieval
philosophical problems, it anticipated a broader movement in modern
crime doctrine, which foregrounds mens rea vis-à-vis behavioral
models of criminal responsibility. But cruelty and the acts that are
culpable under the criminal law are not the same. They speak to dif-
ferent moral and legal intuitions and principles. Hence, whereas
subjectivism expanded the overlap between modern crime theory and
theories of justice, subjectivism reduces the scope of the concept of
cruelty. It is thus unsurprising that whenever courts decide to narrow
the basis for ndings of cruelty, they seek refuge in the agent-
subjective conception.68
The elegance of Aquinas's jurisprudence is to be admired. However,
a normative model in criminal law premising agent-based conceptions
of cruelty on the existence of an objective normative order that tells
vice and virtues apart is inadequate for multicultural societies living
under liberal democratic systems of criminal and constitutional law.
This is increasingly true for international criminal law and human rights
systems. Indeed, such a model has considerable theological,
metaphysical, and jurisprudential problems to resolve before it can get
o the ground.
Furthermore, on the cultural front, agent-objective and agent-
subjective conceptions of cruelty cannot capture all instances of
cruelty that our moral and legal sensibilities can now detect. Case law
as exemplied in the Introduction shows that courts on both sides of
the Atlantic have discovered this shortcoming.69 A normative model is
certain to fail if it seeks to resolve all problems of personal predica-
ment that impinge on human dignity by focusing on the agent side of
the agent-victim relation. Focusing instead on the victim side of this
68
See Barrozo, Reconstructing, supra note 4.
69
For detailed analysis of relevant case law in the United States see Barrozo,
Reconstructing, supra note 4.
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relation is an expected reaction to the perception that the previous
normative models has been exhausted. But how would cruelty look
from the victim side of this relation — from a perspective that relies
comparatively less on the legality and morality of cruel agency, with its
intricate economy of vices and virtues, and more on insight into what it
must feel like to suer cruelly, no matter at whose hands?
III. Cruelty As Sentience: Victim-Subjective Conception
The victim-subjective conception of cruelty, which we owe to
Montaigne, turned the table on agent-based conceptions. Victim
subjectivism presupposes cruel agency, thus also remaining an agent-
dependent conception. However, the denitional element of cruelty
rests in the victim's intense experience of suering. Cognitively,
compassion is the key impulse in the identication of instances of
cruelty. The normative model associated with victim subjectivism
stipulates that sensibility counts more than reason. Consequently, the
perspective from which to understand cruelty is that of the suering
subject. In the context of punishment, cruelty obtains when someone
experiences severe suering as a result of being subject to punitive
agency. In recent applications of the victim-subjective conception, that
agency need no longer specically intend to cause suering for cruelty
to obtain.70
Montaigne's essay on cruelty is shorter than Seneca's or Aquinas's.71
His intellectual style is less assertive, his prose less pompous, and his
analyses, at points, less coherent72 than theirs. His essay is, nonethe-
less, astonishing. Much of the current understanding of cruelty is a
cultural heir of the perspective on cruelty that Montaigne helped bring
to the center of modern culture, particularly the sense of guilt for the
suering of others.73
While I focus on the conception of cruelty Montaigne contributed, it
is important to keep in mind that he was one of the rst modern think-
ers to put forward a completely non-metaphysical conception of law
70
See Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 179 L. Ed. 2d 969 (2011).
I discuss the mens rea requirement of cruelty in Barrozo, Reconstructing, supra note
4.
71
An analysis of Montaigne's ideas on law, customs, natural and social orders,
etc., would be of course helpful in the contextualization of his innovation on the theme
of cruelty. It cannot, unfortunately, be done within the bounds of this essay.
72
Montaigne, it should not be forgotten, is a self-proclaimed champion of
contradictions in thought, if thought is to better reect life as it is.
73
Speaking about the origins and nature of our civilization, Freud sought to
“represent the sense of guilt as the most important problem” in its development. The
price paid by the cultural availability of the sense of guilt was, according to Freud,
very high indeed: “for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the
heightening of the sense of guilt.” Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents 97
(James Strachey trans., Norton 1989). For insight into this sense of guilt see Friedrich
Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality (Cambridge Univ. Press 2000).
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and a contextualizing and demystifying conception of legal authority.74
This matters because when law and customary norms are contextual
and their authority culture-specic, focus tends naturally to be directed
to the dierences that tangibly matter, such as, in the case of
Montaigne, suering. Rather than adopt a theologically and metaphysi-
cally charged normative model like those of Seneca and Aquinas,
Montaigne embraces a lighter, expressionist approach to “morals.” In
his moral outlook, Montaigne relies more on the cultivation of sensibili-
ties and on the heightening of the sense of guilt than on engaging in
the sometimes too-arid philosophical debates about norms, behavior,
and intentions. Montaigne knew that, as Smith came to articulate it in
the eighteenth-century, “no action can be properly called virtuous,
which is not accompanied with the sentiment of self-approbation.”75 It
is precisely this sentiment of self-approbation that a sense of guilt in
relation to cruelty would encumber. Ultimately, this encumbrance
makes cruelty incompatible with virtue — a frugal argument, for certain,
but one that is so by design.
Montaigne was a skeptical philosopher. For him, the prevailing
conditions of moral relativism and sensory illusion were inescapable.
He was also conservative in politics. Whereas moral relativism and
liberty of thought are to be enjoyed privately, actual conduct must
comply with customary norms. It is beside the point to speculate, in
the present context, about whether Montaigne's conservatism fol-
lowed from his skepticism or his skepticism from his conservatism.
The fact is that, for Montaigne, the routinized experience of privacy
and the uniqueness of each person engender radically idiosyncratic
worldviews. The resulting moral pluralism in turn gives rise to a
profound mistrust of any form of universalism.
Montaigne's skepticism found refuge and consolation in abiding by
what Hume used to call “the common aairs of life”76 and in the cultiva-
tion of compassion, both common themes in early modern humanism.
74
As is well known, Montaigne has much to say about laws and customs in his
peculiar form of legal historicism. However, the new normative vista opened by his
take on cruelty does not require explication of his legal thought the same way Aquinas'
did.
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Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 179 (Liberty Fund 1982).
76
“But what have I here said, that reections very ren'd and metaphysical have
little or no inuence upon us? This opinion I can scarce forbear retracting, and
condemning from my present feeling and experience. The intense view of these
manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me,
and heated my brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look
upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what?
From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return?
Whose favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround
me? And on whom have I any inuence, or who have any inuence on me? I am
confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable
condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness, and utterly depriv'd of the
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The inclination toward ordinary life brought along, in Montaigne's case,
a relentless defense of the actual normative structure of society:
customs, which included the laws, long established habits and social
manners, and morality in general. Naturally, this defense of the actual
social arrangement goes well with a skepticism that is phobic of social
invention, as is Montaigne's.
Montaigne would only moderate his defense of the social status quo
under the recommendation of compassion. Even if, from a cognitive
point of view, universalism is impossible, it is still not a priori impos-
sible to experience the feelings of fellow beings. It was in the capacity
to represent the feelings — co-passio — of other creatures, not in the
impossibility of importing and internalizing their worldviews, that
Montaigne would nd inspiration to favor eorts to mitigate the horrors
of existing social arrangement, despite his conservatism. It is in this
context that Montaigne's thought on cruelty and the accompanying
normative models is to be understood.
Like Aquinas, Montaigne studied Seneca. In fact, he begins his es-
say on cruelty by copying directly from Seneca's style in De Clementia.
As Seneca's style was determined by the urge both to educate Nero
and sensitize him to the pain of others, Montaigne's style was designed
to sensitize an audience that could hardly care less about the
jurisprudential intricacies of a notion of cruelty. But while Seneca's
audience was constituted in the rst place by Nero, a person placed in
a very special circumstance, Montaigne's audience was the ordinary
person, the person who, in his or her mundane existence, was neither
philosopher nor saint. Indeed, the ordinary person nds alien the
thought that “it is more beautiful to prevent the birth of temptations by
a sublime and god-like resolve.”77 Also uncommon is the possession
of an “aable nature,” a personality “which of itself nds indulgence
and vice distasteful”78 and is therefore naturally unsuited for it.
Montaigne, in his eort to befriend his audience, placed himself among
those of aable nature, for, as he confessed, he would nd “in many
use of every member and faculty.[. . .] Most fortunately it happens, that since reason
is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature herself suces to that purpose, and
cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of
mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all
these chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with
my friends; and when after three or four hour's amusement, I wou'd return to these
speculations, they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot nd in my
heart to enter into them any farther. Here then I nd myself absolutely and necessarily
determin'd to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common aairs of life.”
David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature 268-69 (Clarendon Press 1978).
77
Michel de Montaigne, On Cruelty, in The Complete Essays 472, 476-77 (M.A.
Screech trans., Penguin 1991).
78
Montaigne, supra note 77, at 476-77.
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cases more rule and order in my morals than in my opinions, and my
appetites less debauched than my reason.”79
For the ordinary person who was neither philosopher nor saint,
virtue had to be won. Indeed, a mark of the normative models from
which Montaigne writes is the redenition of virtue as something
earned in battle, for “virtue rejects ease as a companion.”80 Virtue
nds its foundation in the victory of the gentle part of the self over the
part that internalizes socially conditioned and naturally developed
desires that resist compassion. Unless there is a struggle against the
self to avoid vice and do good, virtue does not obtain: virtue's path is
“rough and thorny.”81 Without this internal struggle, virtuous conduct is
an aberration, an epiphenomenon of a god-like philosophical mind and
resolve, or of a personality whose original appetites coincidentally and
naturally harmonize with the requirements of morality. That is why the
two extremes of the “god-like resolve” and the “aable nature” are
only borderline cases for virtue.
Having established his audience as consisting of the ignorant
multitude living on a battleground where virtue can be earned only by
actively conquering the social and natural forces of vice, and having
dened the central case of virtue as a struggle by imperfect but well-
intentioned natures to overcome vice and to instantiate the good,
Montaigne is nally ready to apply his normative model to the topic of
cruelty. He does this in the usual confessional tone found everywhere
in his essay, proclaiming that of all vices “both by nature and judg-
ment I have a cruel hatred of cruelty.”82 Note that the skeptic in
Montaigne nds it safer to rely upon sensibility than reason: “I am so
soft that I cannot even see anyone lop the head o a chicken without
displeasure, and cannot bear to hear a hare squealing when my
hounds get their teeth into it.”83 Incidentally, similar moral pessimism is
found in the anti-cruelty liberal tradition mentioned above.
When Montaigne attributes his hatred of cruelty to his natural soft-
ness, he is already electing compassion — a sentiment that will be so
important to Rousseau, Smith, and Hume later on — to lead the revolt
against the vice of cruelty. The faculty of representation is fundamental
to the operation of compassion. The image of the decapitated chicken
or the sound of the squealing hare makes the suering of another be-
ing real to the observer through the senses of sight and hearing,. This
is by denition the job of representation: to make it possible to import
into one's mind the feelings and perceptions of others. Once this
79
Montaigne, supra note 77, at 479.
80
Montaigne, supra note 77, at 474.
81
Montaigne, supra note 77, at 474.
82
Montaigne, supra note 77, at 480.
83
Montaigne, supra note 77, at 480-81.
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enlargement of one's sensory universe to incorporate the pain and
terror of others is completed, one is bound to see the world from the
perspective of suering.
However, as Montaigne learned from Seneca and Aquinas, the vice
of cruelty is understandable only as a derivation of cruelty itself.
Therefore, one must rst know what cruelty is before one can become
capable of evaluating courses of action prone to cause such cruelty.
At this point in his argument, Montaigne's conceptual crafting is much
less seamless than that of Seneca or Aquinas. Montaigne does not of-
fer a conception of cruelty comparable in jurisprudential detail and
complexity to those of Seneca or Aquinas. What Montaigne does is
simply to place the suering of the victim at the core of the conception
of cruelty. According to him, it is in the act of causing suering, in the
actual victimization, and while it is happening, that cruelty takes place.
There is no cruelty, no matter how unbalanced a course of action or
the state of mind of its agent, unless suering is present. Montaigne's
conception of cruelty is as much agent-dependent as those of Seneca
and Aquinas are victim-dependent. What accounts for the analytical
distinction among their conceptions is the foregrounding and
backgrounding of semantic and normative choices that place either
the victim of cruelty in his suering or the agent of cruelty in his
behavior or state of mind at the center of the concept of cruelty. In
opposition to Seneca and Aquinas, Montaigne subjects all allusions to
acts or states of mind to the controlling criterion of suering. It is suf-
fering that gives to the acts and omissions causally linked to it their
ultimate cruel nature. “If I had not seen it,” says Montaigne, “I could
hardly have made myself believe that you could nd souls so
monstrous that they would commit murder for the sheer fun of it. [. . .
However, it is in] “the pitiful gestures and twitchings of a man dying in
agony, while hearing his screams and groans” that one nds “the
farthest point that cruelty can reach.”84 Were it not for the screams
and groans of a suering victim, there would be no cruelty, despite
any psychological enjoyment that a murderer or other miscreant may
take in his normative breach. Without the victim's extreme suering,
the same acts, previously condemnable as cruel, transubstantiate into
innocent ones. Hence Montaigne's proposal that in order for the polity
to abstain from cruelty while still achieving the ends of punishment,
“exemplary severity intended to keep the populace to their duty would
be practiced not on criminals but on their corpses.”85 On the victim-
subjective conception of cruelty, the state of mind of agents merely
adds a qualication to cruelty, a degree, as it were, of blame for the
vice of cruelty.
In place of an analysis of the kind of suering that the denition of
84
Montaigne, supra note 77, at 484.
85
Montaigne, supra note 77, at 483.
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cruelty requires or an interrogation of the kind of causal weight
required to make an act or omission cruel, Montaigne simply appeals
to human sensibility.86 This sensibility is, however, capable of
education. The training of sensibilities to identify and rebel against
cruelty and to earn virtue by battling vice prescribes a respect for all
sentient creatures, for “natures given to bloodshed where beasts are
concerned bear witness to an inborn propensity to cruelty.”87
In conclusion, while compassion is the key impulse in the identica-
tion of cruelty, the suering of victims is a necessary, although not a
sucient (since his conception is also agent-dependent), denitional
element of cruelty. The political impact of this conception of cruelty
and the urge to educate sensibilities that accompanies it is immense.
One does not need to look far in order to identify heirs of Montaigne's
compassionate conservatism. Because compassion is capable of a
degree of moral generalization often beyond the reach of the moral
and cognitive capacities of humankind, it becomes the instrument par
excellence for the moderation of the most extreme eects of the ef-
forts of society to maintain and reproduce the social status quo. If
knowledge and moral cognitivism are not to be relied upon for the bet-
terment of society, one should rely on compassion to avoid making
things worse.
Irrespective of the merits of Montaigne's argument, there can be no
complete retreat from his conception of cruelty and the sort of sensibil-
ity that it helped create and nourish. Furthermore, the normative model
from which Montaigne writes is remarkably distinct from those of
Seneca and Aquinas. Once the perspective of the suering subject of
cruelty was brought into the normative imagination, a whole new
normative territory was open for colonization — a territory in which we
are to this day willing settlers. Montaigne changed the concept of
cruelty while leaving untouched the theological, metaphysical, and
jurisprudential questions Seneca and Aquinas tried so hard to resolve.
The standing of the victim-subjective conception of cruelty and its
inuence in criminal law cannot be overestimated. Yet it is insucient
to capture conceptually all the instances of cruelty relevant to criminal
law and punishment.
Is it possible to imagine a conception of cruelty that can reach
beyond active agency and its motivations and beyond the actual and
conscious suering of victims? If so, how would such a conception
86
“I feel the most tender compassion for the aiction of others and would readily
weep from fellow-feeling [. . .]. Nothing tempts my tears like tears — not only real
ones but tears of any kind, in feint or paint. I scarcely ever lament for the dead: I
would be more inclined to envy them; but I do make great lamentations for the dying.
Savages do not upset me so much by roasting and eating the bodies of the dead as
those persecutors do who torture the bodies of the living.” Montaigne, supra note 77,
at 482.
87
Montaigne, supra note 77, at 485.
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change the contours of our normative vistas and the criminal law?
What normative models would render such a conception of cruelty
compelling?
IV. Cruelty As Predicament: Victim-Objective, Agent-Independent
Conception
If the life of law is not solely idealism, it is not solely consequential-
ism either. Reective progress is a force to be contended with in the
evolution of criminal law, and the concept of cruelty is a case in point.
The push of reectivity lays bare the limitations of both agent and
victim-based conceptions of cruelty and the normative models they
inhabit. Because they rely on objective norms (either on natural law as
a foundation for an ethics of virtue or as hegemonic social morality),
agent-based conceptions either fail to question the authority of those
norms or base their authority on faith. To the extent that the agent-
based conception is subjectivized, the bar for a nding of cruelty is
raised too high to accommodate the way the rejection of cruelty has
evolved and, at the same time, creates an incentive for elective
ignorance in relation to the cruelty one causes or allows to take place.88
By relying upon the suering of victims, victim-subjective conceptions
fail to capture instances of cruelty in which the victim is deprived of
his senses or consciousness about his predicament. The fourth
conception of cruelty and the normative model that gives it meaning
seek to address these limitations. They transcend discrete agency
and conscious suering as the core denitional elements of cruelty. In
the victim-objective/agent-independent conception of cruelty, agency
is transcended by structural causation and suering is transcended by
violation of human dignity.
The rst three conceptions of cruelty are chiey concerned with
taming power's propensity for brutality and its constant disregard for
the pain of others. The fourth conception broadens this initial concern
to include preoccupation with free and inviolable individual existences.
I argue that the push of reectivity is the force behind this broadening
of the conception of cruelty. If you begin from a position that accepts
reasons for constraining agents of cruelty, and think hard enough
about them — avoiding inconsistencies, unleashing normative entail-
ments, spelling out practical requirements, and seeking universaliz-
ability89 — you will arrive at an agent-independent, victim-objective
concept of cruelty. The point may be simple, but the third normative
88
This is one of the problems with the agent-subjective conception of cruelty in
the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. See the quotes in the Introduc-
tion and Barrozo, Reconstructing, supra note 4.
89
In the Kantian sense of a capacity of special normative formulations to be
made universally required and valid. More on Kant's moral universalism is infra. Once
again, Christine M. Korsgaard's work is illuminating, now on the question of universaliz-
ability in (Kantian) moral theory. See Korsgaard, supra note 10. A helpful in-depth
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model is a conceptually complex and normatively contested terrain in
which the fourth conception of cruelty has to be articulated against
the backdrop of changed legal thought and experience, transformed
cultural patterns, value pluralism, and expanded — although also more
strained — means of social cohesion and solidarity. More importantly,
the normative model that the fourth conception of cruelty inhabits
does not leave behind the previous notions of cruelty. Instead, the ef-
fect is cumulative.
On the fourth conception, cruelty refers to severe violations of the
respect, recognition, and care that the unconditional and inherent
dignity of each and every individual commands. The violation is at-
tributable to personied agency and identiable intention, or to the
existence and operation of impersonal factors that shape the
circumstances of the victims of cruelty, rendering them relatively more
vulnerable to such violations. These impersonal factors are deemed
problematic in light of the cruelty they engender or facilitate, or, with
respect to the vulnerability they create, in light of the requirements of
just forms of interaction or collective life that they fail to meet. In the
context of punishment, according to the victim-objective/agent-
independent conception, cruelty occurs when a grave violation of hu-
man dignity that in normal circumstances would amount to cruelty is
caused by individuals or by the operation of impersonal institutions,
structures or social processes, even if the victim is unaware of his
predicament.
In this section, I focus rst on how the preoccupation with punitive
agency and intention led to the interrogation of structural, system-
wide conditions of punishment. In the sequence, I address questions
of human dignity and vulnerability.90 Once suering-causing agency is
set under moral and legal scrutiny, and a concern with suering is
given legal and moral priority, reectivity demands consideration of
structural causation and suering-independent reasons to care for
others. When seen from this perspective, the rejection of cruelty in
criminal law takes the form of a rejection of disrespect for the dignity
of individuals, especially through brutality, neglect, exploitation, and
subjection.
Analysis of the normative model that sees cruelty as a predicament
requires that insights be gathered from dierent authors. For example,
what in Montaigne was an empathetic preoccupation with suering is
transformed in Kant into a thesis about universal and unconditional
study of the formal requirements of universalizability is found in Wlodzimierz Rabinow-
icz, Universalizability: A Study in Morals and Metaphysics (Springer 2013).
90
Germany is the leading contemporary constitutional experience in developing
and enforcing a legal conception of human dignity. Article 1 (Protection of human
dignity) of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany reads “The dignity of
man is inviolable. To respect and to protect it shall be the duty of all public authority.”
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human dignity, a dignity achieved by mere membership in the species.91
In another example, what was in Seneca and Aquinas a concern with
virtuous and vicious agency in the context of punishment is transmuted
in Marx and Mill into questions about positive and negative structural
conditions for justice, emancipation, and empowerment. These authors
operated largely within a semantic system that, although it was
consistent with cruelty as a concept, never systematically employed it,
nor provided any sustained conceptual analysis of it. Nonetheless,
their inuence upon the jurisprudence of cruelty in criminal law was
tectonic.
. . .
Assuming that concern for the suering of others is not merely
instinctive, why should we care for them? What is the normative basis
for caring for the unknown other in the way we often do? If this norma-
tive basis existed and could be found, would it ground any obligations
with respect to individuals who are not consciously suering? The
third normative model in the rejection of cruelty provides compelling
answers to these questions. Kant is the central gure in the articula-
tion of this model. His Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
recounts the odyssey of practical reason that, by forces internal to
itself, is condemned to dissatisfaction in relation to its ordinary pow-
ers, seeking in critical-reectivity the uncontaminated sources of duty
and a glimpse into the nature of unconditional goodness. It is not, for
Kant, that tested common opinion and ordinary reasoning are
incapable of distinguishing good from evil, or plotting courses of action
consistent with this distinction. The problem, for him, lies in the ease
with which innocence is “seduced” by inclinations, interests, and all
sorts of incentives foreign to the command of idealized duty itself.92
This seduction of mundane goodness is aggravated by what Kant
calls a “natural dialectic,” that is, the rationalization of the seduction
so as to render the original strictness of duty-imposing practical norms
more amenable to contingent consideration of utilities.
There is, however, another dialectic in action in the operation of
ordinary practical reason: the dialectic of reection. According to Kant,
this dialectic “is an essential principle of every use of our reason to
push its cognition to consciousness of its necessity.”93 This reective
folding of reason upon itself in search of assurances about the validity
of its contents is the very element of transition from uncritical to criti-
cal morality. Whereas the judgments and opinions of uncritical morality
or mere moral sensibility suer, in Kant's view, from the undue inu-
91
Later to be extended, under the pressure of the accusation of speciesism, to
complex animal life in general. See, in this regard, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation
(Ecco 2002).
92
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ence of the transitory forces of mundane experience, critical morality,
when successful, is able to reach and articulate axioms that stand a
priori in relation to experience and enjoy the seal of rational necessity.
On the basis of this twofold pillar of independence from experience
and rational necessity, Kant builds the idea of inherent dignity and its
derivative duties, for a “duty in general lies, prior to all experience, in
the idea of a reason determining the will by means of a priori
grounds.”94
To the independence and necessity of the postulates of critical
morality, Kant adds the requirement of universality, which refers not
only to the unconditioned validity of moral norms, but also to a heuristic
for95 and the boundaries of the jurisdiction of these norms. The reec-
tive conscience's representation to itself of a postulate of practical
reason that meets the simultaneous criteria of a priori and universal
rational necessity is, in Kantian ethics, the representation of a law,
“insofar as it and not the hoped-for eect [of the duty performed as
required by it] is the determining ground of the will.”96 Hence, a will so
determined by an a priori and rationally necessary universal law is the
primary, absolute moral good; a good which, it must follow, “is already
present in the person himself who acts in accordance with this
representation.”97
In this scheme of practical reason, virtues of moderation such as
those extolled by Seneca are insucient at best. Wisdom and wit are
indeed desirable and frequently useful, explains Kant, but can also be
instruments of evil and harm if the will behind them is not itself good.98
A good will is the basis of goodness, for, as noted above, it represents
to itself as law the principles of practical reasonableness forged by
reason a priori, before experience, which are universally desirable and
binding. Once a good will represents such a principle as law, it
determines itself solely on the basis of the duty commanded by that
principle. In Kant, reliance on contextual judgment and virtues is
transcended by the idea that the agent's will can be intrinsically good
only on the basis of its exhaustive determination by the self-
representation of an a priori and a-contextual rational duty.
A second transformation occurs when Kant replaces Aquinas'
fourfold normative system with the idea of a universally valid self-
94
Kant, supra note 13, at 62.
95
“I do not, therefore, need any penetrating acuteness to see what I have to do in
order that my volition be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world,
incapable of being prepared for whatever might come to pass in it, I ask myself only:
can you also will that your maxim become a universal law?” Kant, supra note 13, at
57-58.
96
Kant, supra note 13, at 56 (emphasis omitted).
97
Kant, supra note 13, at 56 (emphasis omitted).
98
Kant, supra note 13, at 49 (emphasis omitted).
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legislated law. In Kant, law must go through a reductio ad unum by
reason, whereby both the laws of nature and human laws are
analogized in their universality. This is why he oers the following as
the formula of the perfect good will: “act in accordance with maxims
that can at the same time have as their object themselves as universal
laws of nature.”99
The notion of autonomy as a good will that legislates for itself is the
pinnacle of practical reason for Kant, for “autonomy is therefore the
ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational nature.”100
Built upon the ideas of perfect good will and of rationally necessary, a
priori, and universal maxims as the sole determinant of this will,
autonomy is at once the proof of and test for our humanity. Thus, the
individual, equipped with a reason which bestows upon his will its own
moral laws is, as both an instantiation and receptacle of the good, an
end in himself. From this special dignity necessarily follows, claims
Kant, the duty to see all individuals as potentially autonomous and,
therefore, as ends in themselves101 and inhabitants of an ideational
kingdom of ends.102 Contemplated in their mutually reinforcing relation,
a priori normative reason and the legislative centrality of the self are
considered to be sucient elements for a conception of the inherent
dignity of the person as an end in himself — an end who, as a full
99
Kant, supra note 13, at 86 (emphasis omitted).
100
Kant, supra note 13, at 85 (emphasis omitted).
101
“[E]very rational being, as an end in itself, must be able to regard himself as
also giving universal laws with respect to any law whatsoever to which he may be
subject: for, it is just this tness of his maxims for giving universal law that marks him
out as an end in itself; it also follows that this dignity (prerogative) he has over all
merely natural beings brings with it that he must always take his maxims from the
point of view of himself, and likewise every other rational being, as lawgiving beings
(who for this reason are also called persons).” Kant, supra note 13, at 87.
102
“It is true that, even though a rational being scrupulously follows this maxim
himself, he cannot for that reason count upon every other to be faithful to the same
maxim nor can he count upon the kingdom of nature and its purposive order to
harmonize with him, as a tting member, toward a kingdom of ends possible through
himself, that is, upon its favoring his expectation of happiness; nevertheless that law,
act in accordance with the maxims of a member giving universal laws for a merely
possible kingdom of ends, remains in its full force because it commands categorically.
And just in this lies the paradox that the mere dignity of humanity as rational nature,
without any other end or advantage to be attained by it — hence respect for a mere
idea — is yet to serve as an inexible precept of the will, and that it is just in this
independence of maxims from all such incentives that their sublimity consists, and the
worthiness of every rational subject to be a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends;
for otherwise he would have to be represented only as subject to the natural law of
his needs.” Kant, supra note 13, at 87-88.
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member of a kingdom of ends, must never be used solely as a means
to achieve the ends of others.103
From the incommensurability of autonomy — “in the kingdom of
ends everything has either a price or a dignity. What [. . .] is raised
above all price and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity”104
— is derived the duty of unconditional respect for the inherent dignity
of each person as such. This command is the third transformation that
Kant's normative model contributes to the concept of cruelty. What in
Montaigne was an empathizing concern for the pain of the other, in
Kant is a rational command to respect the dignity embodied in each
and every individual. In Kant, the sensibility articulated by Montaigne is
pushed toward its reective horizon. It becomes a vision about what a
collective life under conditions of critical morality would require from all
its members, and to what it would entitle them: “now, morality is the
condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself,
[. . .] a lawgiving member in the kingdom of ends.”105
On a more general point, the idea of individuals possessing an
inherent and unconditional dignity that commands universal and
unconditional respect has had a profound impact on modern moral,
political, and legal reasoning. This idea is also the force behind the
modern understanding of liberty as emancipation, where the negative
concept of liberty as protection from undue interference is transformed
into an armative concept of liberty as shaping individual and collec-
tive futures. It has furthermore enabled the criticism of courses of ac-
tion, individual or collective predicaments, and states of aairs even
103
Here is the archetypical formulation of this idea in the Kantian corpus: “Rational
nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself an end. This
end would be the matter of every good will. But since, in the idea of a will absolutely
good without any limiting condition (attainment of this or that end) abstraction must be
made altogether from every end to be eected (this would make every will only
relatively good), the end must here be thought not as an end to be eected but as an
independently existing end, and hence thought only negatively, that is, as that which
must never be acted against and which must therefore in every volition be estimated
never merely as a means but always at the same time as an end. Now, this end can
be nothing other than the subject of all possible ends itself, because this subject is
also the subject of a possible absolutely good will; for, such a will cannot without
contradiction be subordinated to any other object. The principle, so act with reference
to every rational being (yourself and others) that in your maxim it holds at the same
time as an end in itself, is thus at bottom the same as the basic principle, act on a
maxim that at the same time contains in itself its own universal validity for every
rational being. For, to say that in the use of means to any end I am to limit my maxim
to the condition of its universal validity as a law for every subject is tantamount to
saying that the subject of ends, that is, the rational being itself, must be made the
basis of all maxims of actions, never merely as a means but as the supreme limiting
condition in the use of all means, that is, always at the same time as an end.” Kant,
supra note 13, at 86-87, emphasis omitted.
104
Kant, supra note 13, at 84.
105
Kant, supra note 13, at 84 (emphasis omitted).
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when confronted with the complacency, acceptance or indierence of
those subjected to them. In fact, to claim rights in the name of others
has become the common practice not only in the courts of law, but in
politics, social movements, and reform mobilizations everywhere. Were
we not able to make claims on behalf of those incapable or unwilling
to make them, modern law, society, and politics would be so much
changed as to be unrecognizable.
The normative vault under which we act and think, and beneath
which our laws are created and enforced, is shaped by the power of
the idea of an inherent and unconditional dignity, the respect for which
transcends instrumental interests, passions, and compassion. It has
transformed modern criminal law, even as it struggles to grasp and
live up to the demands and implications of human dignity. The idea of
human dignity enhances the intellectual resources available to
principled as well as to emotionalist rejections of cruelty. However, it
does not exhaust the cruelty-as-predicament normative model. Human
dignity needs to be complemented by sociological imagination and the
insights into social structures and processes it provides.106
. . .
In the nineteenth century, social theory challenged methodological
individualism as an explanatory model for socio-legal phenomena. To
complement or rectify explanatory atomism, social theory appealed to
social structures, systems, and processes as the forces that cause
social phenomena, directly or through the conditioned agency of
individuals. Criminal law was not immune to the focus on structures,
systems and processes. As evidenced by the fourth group of quotes
in the Introduction, courts have been aware of the structural causes
that enable cruelty, brutality, suering, exploitation, disrespect for the
dignity of the person, and vulnerability. However, how ideas of human
dignity and social structures came together to forge a paradigm of
practical reason for cruelty seems to have escaped the courts.
The rst thing to understand about structural thinking is that
structural causes or conditions can be positive or negative. Negative
structures function by restricting or ltering out opportunities for
escaping cruelty and by maintaining conditions that favor cruelty.
Positive structures, on the other hand, set in place the causes of
cruelty and the conditions under which it thrives.
Closely intertwined with negative structure and positive structure is
the idea of vulnerability. The rejection of vulnerability has been
expressed in two ways. The rst rejects vulnerability as an intrinsic
component of the human predicament and responds to this predica-
ment with mental ight — ataraxia: tranquility and suspension of judg-
106
C. Wright Mills dened sociological imagination as knowledge about the ways
biography and history intersect. See C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination
(Oxford Univ. Press 2000).
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ment in the ancient Pyrrhonic and Epicurean traditions — and practical
evasion. The second type of rejection embraces the risks of vulner-
ability that inhere in intellectual, moral, and practical engagement. It
focuses instead on imagining strategies for individual and collective
empowerment. It is in this second expression that a concern with
vulnerability is best understood in the context of the third normative
models in the rejection of cruelty.
John Stuart Mill was instrumental in articulating the idea of the
negative structure. A good social theorist, Mill recognized that modi
vivendi shape human character.107 Social theory has a conservative as
well as a progressive branch. It is to the latter that Mill — with his
commitment to “social and political emancipation”108 and the feeling of
angst resulting from the certainty that “any society which is not
improving, is deteriorating”109 — belongs. The rst insight into negative-
structure thinking predates Mill However, Mill placed his own version
in the context of the modern rejection of social stasis and naturalized
inequality, rendering it fully modern. To stagnation and naturalization of
social hierarchy, Mill responds with hopes for individual bildung and
social mobility under conditions created by liberal politics. But above
all, it is the realization that institutions never enter social life at a
perfectly isonomic starting point for their members that makes the
idea of negative structure important in criminal law. When they arrive
in social life, the institutions of criminal justice operate to crystallize
previous social arrangements and distributive patterns. Mill makes this
point about laws in general:
Laws and systems of polity always begin by recognizing the relations
they nd already existing between individuals. They convert what was a
mere physical fact into a legal right, give it the sanction of society, and
principally aim at the substitution of public and organized means of as-
serting and protecting these rights, instead of the irregular and lawless
conict of physical strength. Those who had already been compelled to
obedience became in this manner legally bound to it.110
In The Subjection of Women, Mill speaks of the subtle relationships
between social structures and forms of consciousness. In their
evolutionary dynamic, these relationships hide behind the opaque
mechanisms of social cohesion and behavioral patterns. Speaking of
the predicament of women, Mill points to the ways in which embedded
social structures negatively inuence their opportunities to escape
suering, instead rendering them more vulnerable to cruelty and
exploitation. As he unequivocally describes the problem, “sex is to all
107
Mill, supra note 13, at 494.
108
Mill, supra note 13, at 568.
109
Mill, supra note 13, at 574.
110
Mill, supra note 13, at 745.
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women [. . .] a peremptory exclusion.”111 A form of exclusion that,
because of the largely stealthy negative operation of its structural
components, remains widely unseen. Invisible, its victims are thus
condemned to “the feeling of a wasted life”112 and suering without
sympathy from the rest of society.
Mill's probing analysis played a major role in the form of criticism of
the status quo that characterized the nineteenth century. He speaks
of the “cruel experience” of those who historically had tried to oppose
the mechanisms of human unhappiness,113 and of how their insubordi-
nation was met with the force of law and the whole apparatus of
social norms and entrenched prejudices. To make things worse, the
rebels appeared “in the eyes of those whom they resisted, [. . .] not
only guilty of crime, but the worst of all crimes, deserving the most
cruel chastisement which human beings could inict.”114 According to
Mill, the legal and customary apparatuses of negative structures are
perpetuated by both the dispersion of victims and the proximity in
which they are kept to the micro-agents of negative structures — in
the case of patriarchal societies, their fathers and husbands; in the
case of the criminal justice system, sentencing judges and prison
wards, among others. Collective action is thus rendered impossible.
This situation, in Mill's eyes, exemplies the deployment of what
Foucault would later name capillary power,115 where, “in the case of
women, each individual of the subject-class is in a chronic state of
bribery and intimidation combined.”116
The practical and institutional mechanisms of negative structure —
for example, marriage as “domestic slavery”117 — are accompanied by
its ideological component, on the inuence of which, Mill asks, “was
there ever any domination which did not appear natural to those who
possessed it?”118 Calling attention to the “fanaticism with which men
cling to the theories that justify their passions and legitimate their
personal interest,”119 Mill's critique of negative structure is carved from
the same stone as its twentieth-century counterparts in critical theory
111
Mill, supra note 13, at 581.
112
Mill, supra note 13, at 582.
113
Mill, supra note 13, at 478.
114
Mill, supra note 13, at 478.
115
According to Foucault, power in its capillary form is “where power reaches into
the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions
and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives.” Michel
Foucault, Prison Talk, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings
1972-1977, 37, 39 (Colin Gordon ed., Harvester Books 1980).
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Mill, supra note 13, at 482.
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and existential feminism: “in the present day, power holds a smoother
language, and whomsoever it oppresses, always pretends to do so for
their own good.”120 Against the instruments of social and cultural order
belonging to negative structures — “institutions, books, education,
society, all go on training human beings for the old, long after the new
has come” — Mill prescribes reform on the shoulders of reection.121
Born to live as equals, according to Mill, individuals require a type of
society in which the virtue of equality can be learned and practiced. It
is exactly this greenhouse for the ourishing of human virtues that
unfair negative structures fail to provide. For example, the subjection
of women, for Mill, causes the family to become a training camp of
despotism.122
Under the reective push of social theory, the uniquely modern
concern with the human predicament is incorporated into moral and
legal thought. This is the concern of an era in which “human beings
are no longer [. . .] chained down by an inexorable bond to the place
they are born to, but are free to employ their faculties [. . .] to achieve
the lot which may appear to them most desirable.”123 The combined
mission of reection, freedom of thought, and institutions based on
equality and liberty is to resist unfair negative structures. Mill calls,
therefore, for an intensied awareness of the surviving remnants in
modern times of pre-modern negative structures, lest society continue
to recreate the fertile soil in which cruelty and vulnerability thrive. The
applicability of negative-structure thinking to the problem of cruelty in
criminal law should be obvious.
. . .
The fundamental insight into the problem of positive structures is
that the diuse agency of macro arrangements can actively and
directly cause cruelty. Karl Marx contributes to this insight, turning the
concern with positive structures into one of the causes célèbres and
canonical themes of modern thought.124 Another protagonist of the
nineteenth-century tradition of social inquiry, Marx focuses on the role
120
Mill, supra note 13, at 524-25.
121
“It is one of the characteristic prejudices of the reaction of the nineteenth-
century against the eighteenth, to accord to the unreasoning elements in human
nature the infallibility which the eighteenth-century is supposed to have ascribed to
the reasoning elements.” Mill, supra note 13, at 473-74.
122
Mill, supra note 13, at 580.
123
Mill, supra note 13, at 488.
124
The causal force of positive structure gured prominently, if in a rustic and
under-developed form, as early as in Plato's work, as the initial exchanges in Laws il-
lustrate. In this tradition, see also Jean-Jacques Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin
and Foundations of Inequality Among Men and Discourse on the Sciences and Arts
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1997).
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of impersonal,125 often inescapable and stealthy, causal complexes set
in place and urged forward by positive structures. Inspiring Marx's
relentless criticism is a little noticed Kantian-style critique of the
instrumentalization of individuals and of dehumanizing social practices.
Comprehension of Marx's contribution is enhanced by placing it in
the context of his philosophy of praxis. From his earlier works through
Das Capital, Marx advances a conception of productive practice —
labor126 — the essential human element of which is the prior ideational
representation of its object — the product of labor. In the product of
labor, “man not only eects a change of form in the materials of nature;
he also realizes his own purposes in those materials.”127 Hence, as
material expression of the self, the product of labor gives an outward
dimension to the otherwise esoteric contents of the consciousness.
For Marx, it is the cumulative and collective process of interposing the
product of labor as a buer between everyday human life, on the one
hand, and immaculate nature, on the other, that humanizes the species
and creates a social, human world. Labor is, in this picture, a neces-
sary constitutive element of the very predicament of social life; it is, in
Marx's words, “an eternal natural necessity which mediates the
metabolism between man and nature, and therefore human life itself.”128
Labor, by denition, does not occur in a social vacuum. Its forms are
predicated upon preexisting macro social structures and their evolu-
tion over time. The historical organization of labor has a direct and
profound impact on the very humanization of the species and the
existential fortuna of each individual self. What, then, if certain histori-
cal forms of labor are inherently cruel in that they engender social
processes of exploitation, misery, existential oblivion, inauthenticity,
125
“I do not by any means depict the capitalist and the landowner in rosy colours.
But individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personications of
economic categories, the bearers of particular class-relations and interests. My
standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of society is
viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual
responsible for relations whose creature he remains, socially speaking, however much
he may subjectively raise himself above them.” Marx, Capital, supra note 13, at 92
(Preface).
126
Hannah Arendt rightly distinguishes between labor, work, and action. Much of
what Marx refers to as labor would correspond to work, the activity of creation of
objects with some independent permanency, in Arendt's conceptual framework. See
Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition ch. III — V (The Univ. of Chicago Press 1998).
127
Adding that “this is a purpose he is conscious of, it determines the mode of his
activity with the rigidity of a law, and he must subordinate his will to it. This subordina-
tion is no mere momentary act. Apart from the exertion of the working organs, a
purposeful will is required for the entire duration of the work. This means close atten-
tion. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work and the way in which it has to
be accomplished, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as the free play of his own
physical and mental powers, the closer his attention is forced to be.” Marx, Capital,
supra note 13, at 283-84.
128
Marx, Capital, supra note 13, at 133.
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and humiliation? If laboring inheres in the human condition, what to say
of the stakes in a form of cruelty that is parasitic to it? When cruelty
takes this form, its agency is found in positive structures rather than in
discrete individual agency.
Structural cruelty, though impersonal in its agency and diuse in its
victimization, has nonetheless both a historical and a moral element,
the combination of which opens up a new normative horizon. In the
specic case of labor in early capitalism, rather than channeling the
humanizing, outward surfeiting of the self into tangible tokens of
creative freedom, labor enslaves, and “just as man is governed, in
religion, by the products of his own brain, so, in capitalist production,
he is governed by the products of his own hand.”129
For Marx, capitalism consists of the dynamic and synergetic
interplay between negative and positive structures. He shares with Mill
the understanding that legal frameworks tend to crystallize regimes of
power allocation and resource distribution prevailing on the ground. In
the case of capitalism, the laborer, pressed by the “cruel nature-
imposed necessity that his capacity for labour has required for its
production a denite quantity of the means of subsistence,”130 is forced
to surrender his existential potential. Deprived of a future, the lower
classes live lives marked by extortion under the legitimizing cover of a
rhetoric of justice and rights, that is in the “very Eden of the innate
rights of man[. . .], the exclusive realm of Freedom, Equality, Property
and Bentham.” But when we leave this sphere where the “free-trader
vulgaris” performs the ventriloquism of rights, justice, and eciency,
the cruel and hitherto veiled reality of the structural conditions of
laboring reveals the laborer to be, in Marx's words of indictment,
“someone who has brought his own hide to market [and] now has
nothing else to expect but — a tanning.”131
The institutions of capitalism as a comprehensive positive structure
operate, according to Marx, with an iron law that commands the misery
of the wage-earning classes; a misery which corresponds to the
substitution of “capitalist exploitation” for “feudal exploitation.”132
Criticizing the political economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries for their idyllization of the passage from feudal bondage to
free labor under capitalism, Marx reminds his readers that the modus
operandi of primitive capital accumulation, with its massive geographi-
129
Marx, Capital, supra note 13, at 771-72.
130
Marx, Capital, supra note 13, at 277.
131
Marx, Capital, supra note 13, at 279-80 (emphases omitted).
132
Marx, Capital, supra note 13, at 875.
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cal dislocation and economic immiseration, are hardly idyllic.133 While
the feudal structure of rural or guild-based labor kept laborers in
abject personal bondage and subjection, it also aorded them some
de facto limits on exploitation and cruelty. With capitalism, the ties of
bondage and subjection are broken and laborers were thrown into the
market as free economic agents. However, this freedom was bought,
says Marx, at a dear price: “robbed of all their own means of produc-
tion, and all the guarantees of existence aorded by the old feudal ar-
rangements,”134 the newly freed laborers were condemned to sell their
only remaining possession — themselves. The history behind this type
of modern vulnerability is that of exploitation based, rst, upon the
expropriation of the means of production and, subsequently, on the
laborer's alienation from the very products of his work and from fellow
human beings. This history, accuses Marx, “is written in the annals of
mankind in letters of blood and re.”135 In fact, he explains, capitalism
as a positive structure forces the individuals to live a “double life” as
the abstract moral persona of the citizen entitled to equality and com-
mitted to the public good and, simultaneously, as the egoistic member
of the civil society, acting as a private rent-seeker using, in Kantian
language, “other people as means.”136
Confronted, on one side, by the new forms of suering engendered
133
Marx, Capital, supra note 13, at 87 (“[I]n actual history, it is a notorious fact
that conquest, enslavement, robbery, murder, in short, force, play the greatest part. In
the tender annals of political economy, the idyllic reigns from time immemorial.”).
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Marx, Capital, supra note 13, at 36. The entire passage, with emphases omit-
ted, reads: “Where the political state has attained its true development, man leads —
and not only in thought, in consciousness, but also in reality, in life — a double life, a
heavenly one and an earthly one, a life in the political community, in which he counts
as communal being, and a life in civil society, in which he acts as a private individual,
views other people as means, debases himself to the status of a means, and becomes
the plaything of alien forces. The political state relates just as spiritually to civil society
as heaven does to earth. It stands in the same opposition, and overcomes it in the
same way as religion overcomes the limitedness of the secular world, i.e., by recogniz-
ing, restoring, and allowing itself to be governed by civil society. Man in his immediate
reality, in civil society, is a secular being. Here, where he counts for himself and others
as a real individual, he is a false semblance. In the state, on the other hand, where
man counts as a species-being, he is an imaginary member of an illusory sovereignty,
is robbed of his actual individual life, and is lled with an unreal universality.” Marx
proceeds to add that “Political democracy is Christian in that in it man [. . .] has value
as a sovereign being, the highest being, but this is man in his uncultivated, unsocial
aspect, man in his accidental existence, man just as he is, corrupted by the entire
organization of our society, lost to himself, alienated, under the domination of inhuman
relationships and elements — in a word, man who is not yet an actual species-being.
The fantasy, the dream, the postulate of Christianity, namely the sovereignty of man
— but man as an alien being, dierent from actual man — is in democracy a sensu-
ous reality, presence, secular maxim.” Marx, Capital, supra note 13, at 41 (emphases
omitted).
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by modern positive structures and, on the other, by the way in which
dominant forms of legal and economic theory disregarded and
obscured the cruelty inherent in the new human condition, Marx
articulated an agenda of “human emancipation.”137 This agenda
inspired his project of a social order organized upon a normative view
of human entitlements, and, in no uncertain Kantian spirit, constantly
under the inspection of deep-cutting social criticism. Armed with this
criticism, Marx oers a constructive stance on emancipation which
aims at overcoming the vulnerabilities that oppressive positive
structures engender. Human emancipation takes on a concrete dimen-
sion in human praxis and its institutional forms. This, in turn, leads to a
material view of the requirements of emancipation.
Marx's materialist analysis nonetheless has an important ideational
component. Because the general conditions of human praxis engender,
in Marx's as well as in Mill's views, an overgrowth of mutually reinforc-
ing institutional and ideational apparatuses, an eective critique of op-
pressive positive structure must target also the ideational mechanisms
of rationalization, legitimation, and veiling. Reason is urged, in the
Socratic fashion, to overturn itself in order to break free from its self-
imposed fetters. However, how is reason supposed to remove its
blindfold if “it is not the consciousness of men that determines their
being, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their
consciousness”?138 Here is a conundrum that constantly haunts reec-
tive hopes.
Marx's answer to this conundrum is, as hinted at above, an ethos;
an ethos that tries to carve in human existence a balcony from which
things become visible as they really are, in their intricate mechanisms
and suering-causing capabilities. This critical posture should, he
recommends, “start out by taking any form of theoretical and practical
consciousness and develop from the unique forms of existing reality
the true reality as its norm and nal goal.”139 It should turn itself into a
“ruthless criticism of everything existing.”140 Unforgiving criticism as a
life posture “must not be afraid of its own conclusions, nor of conict
with the powers that be.”141 However, once it manages to climb all the
way up to that balcony, enlightened consciousness is not supposed to
137
“After history has long enough been reduced to superstition, we are going to
reduce superstition to history. The question of the relationship of political emancipa-
tion to religion becomes for us the question of the relationship of political emancipa-
tion to human emancipation.” Marx, On the Jewish Question, supra note 13, at 33-34
(emphases omitted).
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indulge itself in banal exercises of idealistic blue-printing.142 The proper
task appointed by Marx for the unfettered and awakened reective
conscience is both profoundly modern and philosophically archaic in
its callings. He writes:
The reform of consciousness consists only in enabling the world to
clarify its consciousness, in waking it from its dream about itself, in
explaining to it the meaning of its own actions. [. . .] Our motto must
therefore be: Reform of consciousness not through dogmas, but through
analyzing the mystical consciousness, the consciousness which is
unclear to itself [. . .]. Then it will transpire that the world has long been
dreaming of something that it can acquire if only it becomes conscious
of it. It will transpire that it is not a matter of drawing a great dividing line
between past and future, but of carrying out the thoughts of the past.
And nally, it will transpire that mankind begins no new work, but
consciously accomplishes its old work. [. . .] It is a matter of confession,
no more. To have its sins forgiven mankind has only to declare them to
be what they really are.143
With the critique of positive structures, the conception of cruelty in
criminal law is inoculated with another agent-independent component.
Only those prepared to pay a signicant intellectual price can remain
oblivious to the pervasive impersonal social mechanisms of exclusion,
exploitation, immiseration, and humiliation. When we think about the
development of clusters of normative arguments tenable under condi-
tions of reectivity, the critique of positive structures stands out as an
integral part of the novel normative models in law. In this model,
sociological imagination — in the sense of critical awareness of the
nature and operation of social structures and processes as they work
to the detriment of individuals and groups — in the service of
emancipation replaces an objective normative system supposedly able
to tell virtue from vice.
. . .
The fourth conception of cruelty places the denitional focus on hu-
man dignity as the highest value and accommodates positive and
negative structural conditions of cruelty in its causal understanding of
the phenomenon. This signicantly enhances the capacity of the
conception to capture cruel predicaments, which the former concep-
tions failed to bring under their meaning. Furthermore, the argumenta-
tive structure of the normative model cruelty as predicament is capa-
cious enough to subsume both agent and victim-based conceptions of
cruelty. Under the victim objective/agent independent conception of
cruelty, violations of human dignity that in normal circumstances reach
the suering threshold for cruelty constitute a sucient criterion for a
nding of cruelty. This is the case even if the victim is unaware or
unconscious and no individualized agency is causally responsible. By
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necessity, cruelty also obtains when discrete agency and actual suf-
fering obtain.
Conclusion
This Article has detailed four distinct conceptions of cruelty that ap-
pear under-articulated in criminal law sources. I showed that the agent-
objective conception focuses on the agent's behavioral deviation from
objective norms of conduct as the denitional element of cruelty. The
agent-subjective conception also focuses on the agent but requires, in
addition to conduct that violates norms, the presence of mens rea or
other fault of character before cruelty can be found. While these two
conceptions presuppose a sentient victim and share emphasis on
agency as the core denitional element of cruelty, the victim-subjective
conception foregrounds the victim's suering as the central element of
cruelty and is prepared to nd it even in circumstances where ques-
tions about the existence of objective prohibitions, deviation from
those prohibitions, or mens rea cannot be resolved. The victim-
objective/agent-independent denition of cruelty dispenses with the
requirements of individualizable agency and sentient victimhood. This
last conception rests the denitional core of cruelty on violations of
unconditional and inherent human dignity that would normally meet the
suering threshold for cruelty whether the actual victim is or not
conscious or sentient. When it comes to causation, the victim-
objective/agent-independent conception is preoccupied as much with
the positive and negative structural conditions and causes of cruelty
as it is with direct gential causes. In sum, the victim-objective/agent-
independent conception of cruelty incorporates and fundamentally
transcends the understandings of agency, victimization, and causation
found in the other conceptions.
I argued also that cruelty is a problem of practical reason that calls
for solutions. However, I explained, we only start to bridge the gap
between concept and action on the basis of some understanding of
the broader normative models — cruelty as agency, cruelty as sen-
tience and cruelty as predicament — which host and render intelligible
and actionable each conception of cruelty. In this regard, my conten-
tion was that cruelty as predicament extrapolates from and yet
incorporates the previous normative models and their respective
conceptions of cruelty. Cruelty as predicament embraces dignitarian
concerns about individuals and the critique of thought and society as
potential systemic or structural causal factors. The dignitarian
perspective provides the most principled way to identify the violations
that constitute cruelty, while the more sophisticated view of causation
that includes agency as well as structure better captures the causal
complexity behind cases of cruelty.
At this point in the history of criminal law, all four conceptions of
cruelty have currency. It must indeed be so if we are to conceptually
capture the variations of the phenomenon of cruelty and to carry on
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the mission of getting rid of it. And yet, large and small forms of cruelty
are still perpetrated and tolerated by criminal justice systems. One
important reason for the persistence of cruelty is that criminal law
sources and the societies they inhabit still lack understanding of the
various conceptions and the ways each conception separately and all
of them cumulatively engage our practical reason in the quest to ban-
ish the scourge of cruelty.
The best way forward is to take full reective ownership of cruelty
as predicament as the normative model informing all conceptions of
cruelty, for its dignitarian and more sophisticated causal framework
accumulates the lessons from and transcends the previous normative
models. Cruelty as predicament is the most capacious normative model
precisely because it was forged by the push of reectivity that showed
the exhaustion of each of the previous conceptions of cruelty and
their hosting normative models.
Were courts and legislators to take full reective ownership of
cruelty as predicament they would understand better all the concep-
tions of cruelty they employ. But even in the current truncated, under-
articulated way they represent cruelty, criminal law sources reect the
fundamental role in the evolution of criminal law that has been played
by the opposition to cruelty.144 The task that remains is to tap the
potential of a jurisprudence of cruelty to work a profound transforma-
tion of the criminal law toward cruelty-free criminal justice systems.
. . .
One should not underestimate the deep connection between, on
one hand, ideals and, on the other, macro changes in moral outlooks
and legal institutions. Ideals do have causal consequence, and
analyses of concepts and understanding of normative models such as
those devoted to cruelty are often helpful in the explanation of social
developments more generally. As a medium between the mind and the
outside world, concepts of the normative kind and normative models
function as evaluative as well as cognitive lenses leading to action.145
As cognitive lenses, concepts are able to conceal, distort, or reveal
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Before I am accused of unbridled optimism, let me say that I see the tensions
that inhere in criminal law as a project of both power and reason. See Alan Norrie,
Law, Ideology and Punishment (Kluwer Academic 1990) and Mark Kelman, Interpre-
tive Construction in Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591 (1981). Identication of these
tensions has a long history, as I hope my analyses of Seneca and Aquinas have
shown. See also Benjamin L. Berger, On the Book of Job, Justice, and The Precarious-
ness of the Criminal Law, 4 Law, Culture & Human. 98 (2008).
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Quentin Skinner oers a good example of the cognitive and normative nature
of concepts based on the well-known phenomenon of the requirements of social
legitimation of the agency of the commercial classes in Elizabethan England: “The
merchant cannot hope to describe any action he may choose to perform as being
‘religious’ in character, but only those which can be claimed with some show of
plausibility to meet such agreed criteria as there may be for the application of the
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parts of the world. As evaluative lenses, concepts can be used to
criticize, justify, or point to action in directions that transform whole
segments of society and culture. That is why analysis of concepts146
and explanation of their embedding normative models is a particularly
fruitful way of discovering, from time to time, what counts as reality
and how it is evaluated and acted upon.
term. It follows that if he is anxious to have his conduct appraised as that of a
genuinely religious man, he will nd himself restricted to the performance of only a
certain range of actions. Thus the problem facing the merchant who wishes to be
seen as pious rather than self-interested cannot simply be the instrumental one of
tailoring his account of his principles in order to t his projects; it must in part be the
problem of tailoring his projects in order to make them answer to the pre-existing
language of moral principles.” He then concludes: “The story of the merchant sug-
gests two morals. One is that it must be a mistake to portray the relationship between
our social vocabulary and our social world as a purely external and contingent one. It
is true that our social practices help to bestow meaning on our social vocabulary. But
it is equally true that our social vocabulary helps to constitute the character of those
practices. To see the role of our evaluative language in helping to legitimate social ac-
tion is to see the point at which our social vocabulary and our social fabric mutually
prop each other up. [. . .] The other moral is that, if there are indeed causal linkages
between social language and social reality, to speak of the one as mirroring the other
may be to envisage the causal arrows pointing in the wrong direction. As the example
of the Elizabethan merchant suggests, to recover the nature of the normative
vocabulary available to an agent for the description and appraisal of his conduct is at
the same time to indicate one of the constraints on his conduct itself. This in turn sug-
gests that, if we wish to explain why our merchant chose to concentrate on certain
courses of action while avoiding others, we are bound to make some reference to the
prevailing moral language of the society in which he was acting. For this, it now ap-
pears, must have gured not as an epiphenomenon of his projects, but as one of the
determinants of his actions.” Skinner, supra note 8, at 21-22. With insight forged
under the “cruel iron” of slavery, Frederick Douglass, when speaking of the particular
condition of slavery in Maryland, positioned as it was at the borders of freedom and
the public opinion there bred, rightly armed that “Public opinion is, indeed, an unfail-
ing restraint upon the cruelty and barbarity of masters, overseers, and slave-drivers,
whenever and wherever it can reach them; but there are certain secluded and out-of-
the-way places, even in the state of Maryland, seldom visited by a single ray of
healthy public sentiment — where slavery, wrapt in its own congenial, midnight dark-
ness, -can-, and -does-, develop all its malign and shocking characteristics; where it
can be indecent without shame, cruel without shuddering, and murderous without ap-
prehension or fear of exposure. [. . .] Public opinion in such a quarter, the reader will
see, is not likely to be very ecient in protecting the slave from cruelty. On the
contrary, it must increase and intensify his wrongs. Public opinion seldom diers very
widely from public practice. To be a restraint upon cruelty and vice, public opinion
must emanate from a humane and virtuous community.” Skinner, supra note 8, at 47-
49.
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The present paper is not an exercise in intellectual history, at least not primar-
ily so. For that one can turn to Daniel Baraz's sound intellectual history of the concept
of cruelty in his Medieval Cruelty: Changing Perceptions, Late Antiquity to the Early
Modern Period (Cornell Univ. Press 2003). An earlier article by Baraz — “Seneca,
Ethics, and the Body: The Treatment of Cruelty in Medieval Thought, 59 J. of Hist. of
Ideas 195 (1998) — had already been helpful at a very early stage of the reections
culminating in the work.
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The study of concepts and normative paradigms is also a reminder
of the contingent and potentially fragile nature of what often achieves
the ontological status of undisputed reality or the normative status of
good or evil independent from reason and from transitory minds and
historical contexts. At the end of the day, the tenure in culture of
concepts and normative models will be a function of internal and
external factors. Of the internal factors inuencing the appeal and
cultural traction of concepts and normative paradigms, maybe none is
more important than their reective strength. That is why, unless
unsurmountable external factors get on the way, I predict that cruelty
as predicament will increasingly carve and shape the normative horizon
before which criminal law will continue to evolve. Indeed, law is not
solely the normatively deaf product of social programing on the basis
of instrumental and intra-systemic rationalities, memetic forms of col-
lective consciousness, brute power, political strategizing, or transitory
public opinion. These are only as important as incomplete factors can
be. Cruelty as predicament is a compelling normative model, well-
positioned to take its share of causation in the evolution of criminal
law.
The more general thesis I defend here is therefore that the evolution
of criminal law is not spared the causal force of the internal push
toward ever greater reectivity which operates from within normative
models as they are subjected to increasingly more pressing demands
of rationality and justication.147
The implications of the “causal” force of reectivity for the
jurisprudence of criminal law are twofold. First, because reectivity is
a fundamental component of any causal explanation of the develop-
ment of modern criminal justice systems, jurisprudential exercises that
fail to take an evolutionary perspective oriented toward increasing
reectivity are incomplete at best. Second, because rationally justi-
able ideals are deeply connected with the push of reectivity, the hope
for a cruelty-free criminal law system is silenced over time if criminal
law theory fails to articulate the normative, institutional, and practical
requirements of such a system.
Reectivity has many allies, but at least as many enemies. Following
the example of the Greeks, Montesquieu prescribed music to sensitize
the soul and soften the temper as prevention against cruelty.148 The
liberal tradition of Judith Shklar and Richard Rorty counsels that we
nurture and combine softness of sensibility with rmness of character
in ways capable of inspiring an ever-enlarging sphere of empathy and
147
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148
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consequent disgust for cruelty.149 Opposing this sort of moral sensibil-
ity, the tradition of Callicles150 and Nietzsche151 confronts us with the
accusation of appeasement of “slave morality,” a morality forever
hostage to resentful normative models. The reective rejection of
cruelty, however, suggests a normative model in criminal law that
diverges from both traditions. The power of cruelty as predicament
lies neither in softened sensibilities and enlarged circles of empathy,
(although we should certainly settle for that if forced to forfeit hope for
more) nor in an appeal to the resentment of the disempowered. The
power of cruelty as predicament lies rather in its greater reectivity
and in how it weaves together in a dignitarian and reective way the
conceptual reach of the victim-objective/agent-independent under-
standing and the three previous conceptions of cruelty.
Maybe a more serious objection to the hopes I place in rationality,
reectivity, and legal and moral constructivism is that which sees evil
— and with it cruelty — as a part of the human condition that we can-
not will away. For example, Paul Kahn has powerfully argued that he
does “not believe we are in a position to reframe the character of our
experience, such that love and evil disappear. In truth,” he added, “we
have no choice about the nature of the human.”152 Kahn may well be
right, for as biographies and history abundantly show, no amount of
rule-following, rational attachment to values or concern with
consequences has proven enough to guard actors against committing
cruelty or societies against embarking on cruel paths.
I expect, however, that this last objection will also be proven wrong
in the longer term. The human condition is not outside evolution. The
expansion or decline of the human capacities to learn, reason, create,
judge, invent, connect, empathize, and act is the most important front
in emancipatory and dignitarian struggles. A future is not impossible in
which these capacities would have evolved enough to largely remove
the blight of cruelty from human institutions. For the sake of this pos-
sible future — near or afar — we need to understand better the no-
tions of cruelty, the normative models they inhabit, and what is entailed
by the ideal of cruelty-free criminal justice systems.
This Article was written with that future in sight. The hope is that
better understanding of the dierent conceptions and normative
149
See Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (Belknap 1984) and Rorty, supra note 16,
which was written in part under the inspiration of the way Shklar connected a victim-
subjective conception of cruelty with a particular tradition of liberal thought. John
Kekes, in his Cruelty and Liberalism, 106 Ethics 834 (1996), resists, in the name of
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models of cruelty in criminal law will facilitate the sort of cultural
introspection that reminds us of the promises of justice, mercy, and
respect for the dignity of every person that criminal law must help
uphold, while at the same time shedding light on the nature of
societies.153 Whatever the future may hold, as we embark on this sort
of cultural introspective journey, we must remain alert to what is at
stake for both individuals and societies in the rejection of cruelty. And
whatever is found at the end of this journey of cultural introspection, I
suspect we would be ill-advised ever to abandon the search for criti-
cal self-knowledge that inspires it.
153
For the classical thesis about the heuristic importance of criminal law for a
general theory of society, see Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (Free
Press 1997).
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